

Confessions of a Latter-Day World Federalist

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With apologies to those readers perhaps misled by the appearance of the word “confessions” in the title of this essay, my intention here is not to emulate the content of *True Confessions*, the somewhat notorious publication that from the 1920s onward entertained mostly young women with such startling and sometimes salacious exposés as “When a Girl Goes to Prison” and “I Couldn’t Forgive My Brother-in-Law.” Rather “confessions” is utilized herein in a manner akin to the “confessions of faith” normally associated with religious sects, albeit sometimes employed in secular contexts. In other words, this essay contains a statement and brief exposition of my various fundamental beliefs regarding the possibility of a genuine federal world government becoming part of existent reality within the foreseeable future.

Equally so, the word “Latter-Day” in the title should not create an apprehension that I intend a screed of the sort that might be issued by “The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,” otherwise known as the Mormon Church. The Mormon religion is especially notable for its relatively recent historical appearance and its temporary condoning of polygamy, but in essence it is just another of the hundred-and-one sects spawned under the overall rubric of Christianity. In the thoughts and information provided herein, there is nothing of a supernatural nature.

To begin with, I proclaim myself to be a “latter-day world federalist” in the sense that I am a more realistic, sensible, and up-to-date world federalist than is the “traditional world federalist.” The traditional world federalist is described as a person who still adheres to the “omnipotent world state” concept that flourished briefly during the ephemeral post-World War II world government boom from 1945 through 1950. The fundamental doctrine of the traditional world federalist is that global human civilization is likely to be destroyed by a nuclear holocaust in the near future if the nations of the world do not soon establish an all-powerful global state encompassing all the nations of the world and monopolizing all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.

History records that this perception was highly unpersuasive to the large majority of people even at the height of the Cold War that had global human civilization hanging precariously over a nuclear abyss through four long decades from the 1950s through the 1980s. The general consensus among the vast majority, from the intelligentsia to the political leadership to the general population, over all the nations of the world, was that such an “omnipotent world state” would very

likely lead—sooner or later as the case might be—to a global tyranny as bad as anything witnessed under Hitler’s Third Reich, Stalin’s Soviet Union, or Mao’s Red China. The possibility of nuclear disaster was a small price to pay in order to forestall such a terrible fate. Now that the Cold War is apparently finished thanks to the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the traditional world federalist perception has become virtually negligible. Accordingly, the number of traditional world federalists has become minuscule, virtually microscopic. The only current purpose of this microscopic minority appears to be to pour cold water on any and all ideas and proposals short of the omnipotent world state.

There are, of course, any number of ideas and proposals toward a better world that are short of the omnipotent world state. But almost all of these ideas and proposals strongly and explicitly distance themselves from anything and everything remotely resembling world government. Currently the “great white hope” for humanity’s future lies in the concept of global governance, a concept often explicitly distanced from global government. For example, in the Foreword to *Our Global Neighborhood* (1995), the editors inform the reader: “As this report makes clear, global governance is not global government. No misunderstanding should arise from the similarity of the terms. We are not proposing movement towards world government, for were we to travel in that direction we might find ourselves in an even less democratic world than we have—one more accommodating to power, more hospitable to hegemonic ambition, and more reinforcing of the roles of states and governments rather than of the rights of people.”

There is no denying that there are innumerable encouraging examples of international understanding and cooperation operative in the contemporary world. The United Nations is probably the primary example of these, but there are literally hundreds of others. To some people, all this ongoing global governance adds up to the proposition that global government is needless, because global governance can do everything a global government could do—but without involving a totalitarian threat. As prevalent as this idea might be, the fact remains that quite possibly it represents little more than wishful thinking, as well as being a dangerous delusion.

The harsh fact remains that despite the United Nations, and despite the manifold additional manifestations of global governance, we still live in a world in which the sovereign nation-state principle is fundamental to international relations. The combination of this principle with the existence of tremendous arsenals of nuclear weapons in a constant state of readiness—available for immediate use should the need arise—is setting up an existential threat that may not be forever avoidable. It is true that the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 mostly eliminated the “communist menace” from geopolitical considerations—but the “communist menace” came about only in 1917 owing to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia. Humanity had been inflicting warfare upon itself throughout all recorded history before 1917; it follows that the threat of war is still very much with us following the disappearance of the communist menace in 1991.

It is no doubt quite true that humanity has become far more cautious with respect to warfare than we were prior to the two World Wars of the twentieth century, capped as they were with the introduction of nuclear weapons. Prior to World War I, it had been a fairly prevalent viewpoint in some quarters that warfare was “healthy” for human society, in the same way that dieting and exercise are healthy for human individuals. Following the experiences of 1914-1945, this viewpoint is now mostly confined to fools and psychotics.

Nevertheless, some national leaders find it necessary, for whatever reason, to skate dangerously close to the line. As this is being written, Russia has undertaken a military invasion of Ukraine, once a treasured SSR of the Soviet Union. Putin's claims of mistreatment of ethnic Russians in Ukraine are eerily reminiscent of Hitler's 1930s claims of mistreatment of ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere. China now claims to be increasingly dissatisfied with the independence of Taiwan, asserting that Taiwan is rightfully an offshore island of mainland Red China, and should be politically united with Red China. Mentions of the possible utilization of nuclear weapons are frequently bandied about, both by those interested in revising the international status quo and by those interested in preserving it. Of course, there have been such threats in the past that were successfully surmounted: the Cuban missile crisis of the early 1960s comes most readily to mind. But it is hardly reassuring to reflect that should such crisis situations continue to emerge, one after the other into the indefinite future—there may come a time when one of them is *not* successfully surmounted.

Neither the United Nations as we know it today, nor global governance as we know it today, seem capable of eliminating this long-term hazard. We may as well concede also that the omnipotent world state is not an acceptable option. While it may be true, as traditional world federalists argue, that even worse than a global tyranny would be a host of local tyrannies in the aftermath of a catastrophic nuclear holocaust, the fact remains that among the huge majority of the contemporary human population, the threat of global tyranny is deemed more perilous than the threat of nuclear holocaust.

It is generally agreed among psychiatrists that it is psychologically unhealthy for people to obsess about unsolvable problems. For example, people should not worry about death, because it is unavoidable. The mechanism might be to simply not think about death, or alternatively, to subscribe to one of the several religions that promise some sort of an afterlife to believers. An analogous mechanism during the worst years of the Cold War was to mentally minimize the threat of nuclear holocaust. People found comfort in the MAD hypothesis (Mutually Assured Destruction), according to which only an insane national leader would start a nuclear war. One problem with this comforting thought is that at certain times and places, certain national leaders may not abide by the restraints one normally associates with sane people. During the 1930s, for example, Adolf Hitler rose to power in Germany by promising the German people, many of whom felt personally humiliated by Germany's defeat in World War I, that he would "make Germany great again." This is eerily similar both to Donald Trump's slogan "make America great again," and to Vladimir Putin's analogous objective to "make Russia great again."

Aside from the fact that one cannot necessarily rely on the objective sanity of national leaders, there are at least two other serious problems with the MAD hypothesis. The first is that the destruction to be brought about by nuclear holocaust is neither necessarily assured nor necessarily mutual. Among serious analysts, starting with Herman Kahn, author of *On Thermonuclear War* (1960) and *Thinking about the Unthinkable* (1962), nuclear war has always been regarded as not only survivable (albeit very costly), but possibly even winnable. The Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") during the Reagan years was one well-known manifestation of this viewpoint. The second problem is that even if all national leaders fully buy into the MAD hypothesis, and are fully sane by objective psychiatric norms, a nuclear war might still come about as a consequence of what strategists refer to as "miscalculated brinkmanship." Most historians agree that while there were a number of operative underlying factors, the immediate catalysts to both World War

I and World War II were instances of miscalculated brinkmanship. The possibility inevitably exists, therefore, that a nuclear World War III could come about via miscalculated brinkmanship.

Now that humanity has been in the post-Cold War era for some decades, the comforting thoughts (sane leaders, MAD, etc.) that enabled people to cope during those hazardous years, are still very prevalent. They have been augmented by another comforting thought: global governance. These thoughts—“assumptions” would be more accurate—help people to cope with the uncongenial reality that an abundance of nuclear weaponry continues to exist in the contemporary real world, and it continues to be held in a state of constant readiness by national leaders who are quite accustomed to the fact that it is not impossible that someday—for whatever concatenation of unfortunate circumstances—they will have to be unleashed. This situation is the inevitable consequence of the existence of these weapons along with an international system that is reasonably describable as “quasi-anarchy.” It is not “pure anarchy” because of the existence of the United Nations and numerous other components of global governance. But it is indeed “quasi-anarchy” because there is no effective higher political authority over the nations of the world.

The fundamental reason why people resist recognizing and acknowledging this reality is that they believe firmly that there is no practical solution to this reality, no feasible means of escaping it. In this respect, it is thought to be a reality analogous to the reality of death itself. Just as it is psychologically unwise to reflect on the reality of death, so too it is unwise to reflect on the reality that the contemporary international system is both nuclear-armed and quasi-anarchic.

However, this particular belief is false, unfounded, dysfunctional, and may eventually be toxic to the future of global human civilization. Personally I fully agree that the “omnipotent world state” proposal of the traditional world federalist is not an acceptable solution to quasi-anarchy because of the possible propensity of such a state toward a form of totalitarian tyranny that would reduce humanity to the lowest depths of oppression and misery.

The question remains, however, whether there might be world government options available that fall somewhere between the ineffective United Nations of today, and the omnipotent world state advocated by traditional world federalists. I firmly believe that such options do in fact exist: that it would in fact be possible to establish a genuine, legitimate, functioning world government that would constitute a minimal threat of evolving into a horrific global tyranny. An example of such a happy medium would be the Federal Union of Democratic Nations, a proposed institutional blueprint for world government that I have described, explicated, and evaluated in a substantial amount of published writing over many years.

The initial seeds of this concept began germinating in my mind as far back as the early 1960s, and by the early 1970s it was fully developed. I recently published a book, *Explorations and Proposals toward Market Socialism and World Government: A Visionary Odyssey* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2022) that explains the origin and evolution of my world government thinking, which in the beginning and for a long time thereafter, was closely intertwined with a specific form of democratic market socialism I designated “pragmatic market socialism.” It might well be wondered how two such apparently disparate concepts as market socialism and world government became so closely associated with one another.

At the time I commenced my undergraduate college studies in the early 1960s, my viewpoints on

both socialism and world government were typical of the majority viewpoints both at that time and since then: they were harshly negative. My perception of socialism was strongly influenced by the horrific conditions prevailing in Stalin's Soviet Union of the 1930s and 1940s, and in Mao's Red China during the 1950s and 1960s. But at the same time I recognized that softer, gentler forms of socialism were possible, as represented, for example, by the cradle-to-grave security of Scandinavian social democracy. But even at its best, so I thought, socialism would bring about suffocating bureaucracy, stifling paternalism, and excessive egalitarianism. As for world government, that would most likely be far worse. I accepted without question Kenneth Waltz's judgment, stated in *Man, the State and War* (1959), that "were world government attempted, we might find ourselves dying in the attempt, or uniting and living a life worse than death."

But owing to a conjunction of factors (of which that which stands out most clearly in my mind was a reading *The Power Elite* by the iconoclastic sociologist C. Wright Mills), by the end of my freshman college year, I had undergone an epiphany of sorts, the consequence of which was a radical revision of my viewpoints on both socialism and world government. In fact, I had come to believe that both socialism and world government—presuming they were *properly designed and implemented*—would most likely be extremely beneficial to humanity, and would go far toward assuring a benign future for the human race.

To begin with, an optimal socialist system would dispense with both the central planning system and the totalitarian political system of Soviet Russia and Red China, as well as certain dysfunctional features of social democracy. However, it would comprise public ownership of the preponderance of the non-human factors of production capital and natural resources (with some exceptions such as small business and entrepreneurial business). Such an optimal system would be a variety of democratic market socialism that I labeled "pragmatic market socialism," to distinguish it from certain other market socialist proposals within the economic systems literature, such as the "marginal cost pricing" plan of Oskar Lange. The workings of pragmatic market socialism would be virtually identical to those of market capitalism: the only important difference would be that capital property return (dividends, interest, capital gains, and so on), instead of being paid out mostly to a tiny minority of extremely wealthy capitalists, would instead be paid out as a social dividend supplement to the labor income (wages and salaries) of the entire population. This would result in a significantly more fair and equal distribution of income, without incurring adverse effects on economic efficiency and growth.

Continuing, an optimal world government would dispense with certain key characteristics of the "omnipotent world state" as normally envisioned by both the large majority of world government skeptics, as well as the small minority of world government advocates (traditional world federalists). Instead of requiring that all nations without exception become components of the world state, and be forbidden from departing, the optimal world government would maintain an "open door" policy, according to which adherence to the federation would be at the discretion of national governments, and member nations desiring to depart the federation could do so without opposition. Furthermore, in sharp contrast to the "omnipotent world state" concept which would involve the complete disarmament of the member nations and the concentration of all military power under the control of the world state, an optimal world government would allow the member nations to maintain as much military power as they deemed necessary, including nuclear weapons, under their own independent control. Such an optimal world government, which I des-

ignite the “Federal Union of Democratic Nations,” would be a political entity somewhere between the “omnipotent world state” as envisioned by both world government opponents and world government proponents, and the United Nations of today, which is primarily an international debating society with very limited practical influence and authority.

In addition to maintaining an “open door” policy on membership and allowing member nations to possess as much independent military power as they feel necessary, a third essential element of my own “Federal Union” conception of an optimal world government would be a “dual voting” principle in the unicameral Union legislature. According to this principle, in every decision issue each representative’s vote would have two weights: in the population vote the representative’s voting weight would be proportional to the population in his/her district, and in the material vote the representative’s voting weight would be proportional to Union revenues derived from his/her district. Thus in order for any legislation to be approved, there would have to exist a consensus between the more populous poorer nations and the less populous richer nations: the legislation would have to be approved on the basis of both the population and the material vote.

With the assistance of a global economic development effort (the subsidiary economic complement to the political proposal toward world government), the current drastic economic inequality among the nations would be gradually reduced, and with this the differences between population voting weights and material voting weights would diminish. But in the meantime, the dual voting principle would allay fears in the rich nations that the world government would become an instrumentality toward the imposition of a global welfare state, while also allaying fears in the poor nations that the world government would become an instrumentality toward the re-imposition of colonial-style exploitation. An obvious objection to the dual voting proposal is that it would lead to legislative gridlock: the inability to pass anything more than the most trivial legislation. The obvious response to this objection is: How would this be worse than the status quo in which there is no world government at all, no world legislature at all, and hence no possibility of world legislation at all?

Back in the 1970s, the noted international relations authority Richard Falk, in the course of a critique of the proposal of Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn for a “strengthened” United Nations in their magisterial tome *World Peace through World Law* (1966), chided Clark and Sohn for engaging in the fallacy of “premature specificity.” In their book, Clark and Sohn had produced a much-expanded charter for the U.N.—a “constitution” no less—that perhaps went into more detail than was absolutely necessary. However, the actual problem that Falk had with Clark-Sohn was not so much that they got bogged down in excessive detail, but that their proposal for a strengthened United Nations would have transformed that organization into a version of the omnipotent world state advocated by traditional world federalists. Nevertheless, Falk’s well-known 1970s injunction against “premature specificity” has ever since operated as a potent deterrent to serious thinking about the institutional structures of a potential future world government.

This is a highly dysfunctional situation since one cannot begin to make a reasonably persuasive case for world government unless one specifies, to start with, a reasonably detailed blueprint for such a government. One cannot develop a persuasive case for world government on the basis of vague generalities involving the virtues of democracy, the need for compassion and humanity, the philosophical unity of the human species, and so on and so forth. Prior to the successes of the Wright brothers and others in the early years of the twentieth century, for example, it was a fairly

commonplace speculation that the problems of heavier-than-air flight were too great ever to be overcome by human ingenuity. No less a scientific authority than William Thomson Kelvin, better known as Lord Kelvin, is reputed to have proclaimed in 1895: “Heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible.”

There are several problems involved in flight: lift, control, propulsion, power. Prior to the pioneers of the early twentieth century, several unsuccessful designs had been offered. A critical pre-condition for the successful solution of the overall problem was the development of small gasoline engines with a high ratio of power to weight. This solution to the power problem, in conjunction with solutions to the problems of lift, control, and propulsion (wings, ailerons and rudders, propellers), made flight as we know it today possible. Whether or not heavier-than-air flying machines were possible could not have been determined on the basis of speculations employing the general scientific principles of the early twentieth century. It required a workable design involving solutions to the various problems of lift, control, and propulsion, in combination with specific technological advances, to demonstrate conclusively that heavier-than-air flying machines were indeed possible.

Much the same is true with respect to world government. Whether or not a world government is possible and desirable cannot be determined on the basis of general principles from political and other social sciences. The fact that these principles suggest that *some* world government schemes are unworkable does not necessarily establish that *all* world government schemes are unworkable. As gasoline engines turned out to be the solution to the power problem of flight at the turn of the twentieth century, possibly the technological advances that have produced contemporary communications and transportation technology will turn out to be the solution to the analogous “power problem” of world government in the twenty-first century. Even the most convinced world government skeptics have to concede that modern communications and transportation have rendered null and void the coordination problems of large-scale political organizations in the distant past. But instantaneous communications and rapid transportation do not, in themselves, make world government desirable or even possible.

Past appeals for world government have sometimes been accompanied by specific institutional proposals, but more often have not. Some of the best-known, most elaborate, and most adamant appeals for world government from the post-World War II world government boom, such as *The Anatomy of Peace* (1945) by Emery Reves and *The Commonwealth of Man* (1952) by Frederick Schuman, are entirely devoid of any specific institutional proposals. These works lambaste in great detail and most unmercifully the notion that reliable international security may be achieved by any means short of world government—and yet they are completely silent on how that government ought to be organized. The conclusion implicit in their work is that *any* world government—including the omnipotent world state envisioned by traditional world federalists—would be an improvement over the anarchic international system.

In perusing the works of Emery Reves and Frederick Schuman, as well as others of a similar nature, one might well be reminded of Karl Marx’s intemperate 19th century tirades against the capitalist economic system, tirades that were unaccompanied by any significant development of a specific socialist alternative. Marx disdained the task of “writing recipes for the social chefs of the future” on grounds that any socialist system was bound to be superior to the capitalist system, and furthermore, that the appropriate institutional structure of the socialist socioeconomic system

would be transparently obvious to the architects of the revolution once the revolution had been successful. The subsequent history of socialism in the USSR under Stalin, and in China under Mao, clearly demonstrated that the socialist cure may well be worse than the capitalist disease. The experiences of Soviet Russia and Red China have demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that socialism, in and of itself and defined (according to most dictionary definitions) as public ownership of all or most capital property, is by no means *sufficient* to establish a social system preferable to the capitalist social system. Certainly the socialist cure *might* be worse than the capitalist disease.

In the same way, world government is by no means sufficient to establish global conditions preferable to those currently prevailing under the sovereign nation-state system. Clearly, the world government cure *could* be worse than the international anarchy disease. It follows, therefore, that any appeal for world government that is not based on a specific blueprint for world government, is likely to be quite unpersuasive. It is especially critical that specific blueprints, in order to be taken seriously, be clearly and precisely disassociated with the omnipotent world state of traditional world federalism. In order to avoid this problem, my own extensive published work on world government has always been based on a fairly detailed world government blueprint.

During my undergraduate college career back in the early 1960s, I perceived a direct link between pragmatic market socialism and the Federal Union of Democratic Nations. Specifically, pragmatic market socialism represented a possible bridge over the veritable chasm between communist and non-communist ideologies. If the West would adopt pragmatic market socialism, this could inspire the East to abandon central planning and undemocratic political systems. Both West and East might converge on democratic market socialism: the West coming from democratic market capitalism, and the East coming from oligarchic planned socialism. If such a convergence occurred, it would enable substantial disarmament. Some of the resources thus saved could be diverted into a major global economic development program, which I later designated the World Economic Equalization Program (WEED), and still later the Global Marshall Plan (GMP). With the ideological gap eliminated, and the economic gap rapidly diminishing, an effective and benign federal world government will have become feasible and desirable. This was no less than a “vision” of pragmatic market socialism as the initial stepping stone to federal world government.

This was the basic vision that I continued to elaborate, elucidate, and advocate throughout my long working career in higher education, and beyond. Over a period of approximately sixty years, I published no less than fifteen books, plus dozens of articles, on various aspects of the grand design I first formulated during my college years. During that long period of time, the only major alteration in the grand design was caused by the collapse of Soviet communism in 1991. Following that collapse, there was no longer a need for a bridge over the ideological chasm between communism and non-communism. Thereafter there was still a case to be made for pragmatic market socialism as an internal reform within the West, but there were no major international ramifications of that reform. However, aside from ideology, there were, and still are, two very serious impediments to world government: the economic gap, and nationalism.

Not unexpectedly, owing to the focus on socialism and world government within the grand design, there has always been great resistance to these elements, and thereby to the grand design

itself. The strongly entrenched preconceptions and misconceptions that heavily encrust the concepts of socialism and world government make calm and rational consideration of them virtually impossible for a great many people. Despite this obstacle, I have in fact published voluminously on these ideas and proposals in the professional literature. On the other hand, the articles appeared in obscure academic journals, and the books were published as scholarly contributions. There is a critical distinction within the book publishing industry between scholarly titles and “trade” titles. Only trade titles possess significant ability to establish ideas within the realm of general public awareness and discussion. None of my fifteen books was published as a trade title.

Well into my retirement years, I decided to make one final effort to publish a trade title concentrating on socialism (specifically on pragmatic market socialism) and world government (specifically on the Federal Union of Democratic Nations). This would be in the form of an autobiography, in which the substantive ideas would be cushioned, as it were, within an informal, chatty account of my personal life. This would put a “human face” on the ideas, and thus hopefully make them more digestible and appealing to the general reader. My initial effort toward this end was a large manuscript entitled *A Visionary Life*, consisting of almost 650,000 words over 1,300 draft-typeset pages.

Many large-scale book-length biographies and autobiographies are published as trade titles, but the subjects are normally people of wide recognition and acknowledged importance. Occasionally, what might be termed “memoirs by nobodies” are published as trade titles, but these need to be of fairly modest length and to be highly “readable.” A relatively recent example of this was *Angela’s Ashes* (1996) by Frank McCourt. This was an account of McCourt’s youth in an Irish household (“Angela” was his mother’s name) beset with extreme poverty verging on subsistence. This book is very much a “good read” because it satisfies the reader’s morbid curiosity about what a subsistence-level life must be like, plus containing an abundance of curious details, many of which have more than a whiff of Irish blarney about them. Since apparently the single substantive idea in the book is that “poverty is unpleasant,” the book presents no challenges to the typical reader’s preconceived notions and beliefs.

The key difficulty of *A Visionary Life*, from a publisher’s point of view, is that not only is the author relatively unknown, and the length of the book veritably enormous—but in addition to those serious liabilities, the book is likely to challenge some of the typical reader’s preconceived notions and beliefs. The typical reader is likely to have strong opinions about both socialism (in the public ownership sense) and world government: specifically, that both of them are very bad ideas. It is generally agreed that most people are adverse to reading material not in accordance with their existing preconceptions and beliefs. Thus, it was not unexpected that I was unable to find a publisher willing to undertake *A Visionary Life*.

In the past, I had been required to condense substantially a number of my book manuscripts as a condition for publication. Therefore, in order to make publication of my *Visionary Life* memoir more feasible, I decided to jettison most of the coverage of my personal life, in order to focus on my professional career. The condensation, re-titled *Visionary Odyssey*, got the word-count down from approximately 650,000 to a little under 200,000. Even in its trimmed-down form, *Visionary Odyssey* still suffers from two principal liabilities: the author is relatively unknown outside of some narrow professional circles, and the book challenges what are likely to be strong preconceived notions of the typical reader. Therefore, the search for a publisher was difficult—as it

usually has been for my writings containing innovative ideas and proposals concerning socialism and world government. Eventually, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (CSP) perceived sufficient potential in the book to issue a contract. Upon CSP's advice that the original *Visionary Odyssey* title was insufficiently informative to interest potential readers, the title was changed to the longer and more informative *Explorations and Proposals toward Market Government and World Government: A Visionary Odyssey*.

Since all my 15 previous books were published as scholarly titles rather than trade titles, and thus the relatively small number of sales were mostly to the larger university libraries, the ideas within them have not yet become part of general public awareness and discussion. Nevertheless, I derive some comfort from the possibility that eventually these ideas, since they are in print and available upon library shelves, will eventually find their way into general public awareness and discussion. In other words, they might eventually be "discovered," and thus play a significant role in strengthening the future prospects of global human civilization. This is indeed my primary hope for *Explorations and Proposals toward Market Socialism and World Government: A Visionary Odyssey*. A secondary hope, of course, is that *Explorations and Proposals* will, after all, and against the odds, attract significantly more readers—and sales—than my prior books. Time will tell.