How Do We Get There from Here?

Chris Hamer

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Chris Hamer is a Visiting Associate Professor in the School of Physics at the University of New South Wales.

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1. Introduction

World federalists generally agree on the need for a global parliament: global problems require global solutions. Issues such as world peace, climate change and preservation of the global environment, or the fight against poverty, disease and starvation in the Third World, can only be resolved by all nations acting together. Such issues demand a better system of global governance than we presently have, and ideally a global parliament.

The more difficult question is, how do we get there from here? World federalists have been grappling with this problem ever since World War II. Uniting seven billion people in two hundred countries – each jealous of its sovereignty – is an enormous task. Like climbing Mount Everest, it will not be achieved in a single giant bound. We will only get there gradually, through a series of base camps.

The realist Hans Morgenthau, for instance, wrote[1] in 1948 that: "The argument of the advocates of the world state is unanswerable. There can be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world." He argues, however, that such a world state is simply not feasible: "No society exists coextensive with the presumed range of a world state. The nation is the recipient of man's highest secular loyalties. Beyond it there are other nations, but no community for which man would be willing to act regardless of what he understands the interests of his own nation to be. In other words, the people of the world are not ready to accept world government, and their overriding loyalty to their own nation erects an insurmountable obstacle to its establishment." Times have changed since Morgenthau wrote these lines at the beginning of the Cold War, but nevertheless he correctly identifies the major roadblock to a world government.

The Europeans have shown that the obstacle of national sovereignty is not in fact insuperable. After World War II, European leaders such as Jean Monnet and his Action Committee for a United States of Europe determined to put an end to the long series of terrible wars on that continent by integrating the nations. They proceeded in a step-by-step fashion, starting with the original 'Six', and proceeding through a series of treaties to build first the European Coal and Steel Community, then the European Economic Community, and finally the present European Union, which now embraces twenty-eight nation-states and nearly 500 million inhabitants. The

EU is going through some severe trials and tribulations at the present time, but the great original objective is now secure. There will never again be a war between France and Germany.

Similarly, at the world level, we could start with an association with strictly limited aims linking some of the more progressive nations – e.g., the democracies – and then build from there, progressively expanding functions, developing institutions, and including more members, until a democratic world federation is eventually achieved.

What then are the possible routes to a global parliament? The website of the Democratic World Federalists[2] lists four of them:

- · The Constitutional route

- · Reform of the United Nations

- · Uniting the Democracies

- · The Regional route.

The first point to make here is that since nobody can know beforehand which route will prove successful, members of the movement should support expeditions along any or all of these routes. Having said that, one should try to exercise judgment as to which of these routes is the more feasible or more likely to succeed. We shall concentrate here on two of them.

Reform of the United Nations is the most obvious route, and this is where the world federalist movement has concentrated most of its efforts. The UN is the peak body of our present system of global governance, and has an essentially universal membership. But again and again, attempts at reform have come up against the problem of the UN Charter. An amendment to the Charter requires the assent of two-thirds of the member states and all five permanent members of the Security Council, which is extremely hard to achieve. The Charter itself provides for a regular Charter Review Conference, but no such conference has ever been held. The world federalist movement has lost heart, and lowered its aims in recent years to objectives which do not require an amendment to the Charter, such as the Coalitions for the International Criminal Court, or the Responsibility to Protect. These have indeed been great achievements, but still they do not address the basic structural shortcomings of the UN system.

Hence I would argue that the route most likely to lead to success is that of uniting the democracies. This idea was advocated as early as 1939 by Clarence Streit[3], initially as a measure to combat fascism. It would allow the European strategy to be followed, i.e. starting with a smaller group of states to pursue a limited objective, and then evolving step by step by means of successive international treaties towards the eventual goal of a genuine global parliament. A gradual, evolutionary strategy of this sort is far more likely to succeed than a single, giant leap.

The initial members should be democracies, because democracy must be a fundamental principle of any global parliament, to guard against tyranny and guarantee equal rights for all. The

association should be open to new members, provided they satisfy suitable criteria such as democracy, so that over time it will grow to become universal.

The first step would seem to be the formation of a community on the European model, rather than the more ambitious target of a union or federation. Hence we are led to propose a World Community of Democratic Nations (the pithier name Community of Democracies is already taken, unfortunately[4]). I hope that most people in our movement would see the logic in the argument so far.

Now we come to what is likely to be a much more contentious question, namely, what should be the basis or purpose of such a community? Ideally, it should be economic, and have a strong impact on the daily life of the community in order to attract new members, following the European model. But there seems little call at present for a community based on free trade, like the EEC. The world has been pursuing free trade agreements ever since World War II, and the last Doha Round ended in failure. At present, the nations are mostly pursuing bilateral rather than multilateral agreements.

In my opinion, there is a much more obvious need for a community based on common security, a world security community of democracies. The US tried for a time recently to act as 'global policeman' on its own, and has had its fingers severely burnt in most cases. It led interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria which cost huge amounts of money and left chaos behind them, as witness the present maelstrom in the Middle East. It is now widely recognized, I think, that the US needs to work much more closely with its democratic friends and allies. Hence the formation of a security community made up of the democracies would be a natural next step. Such a community would provide a virtually unchallengeable guarantee of security for its members, and could also provide a strong right arm for the United Nations in security and peacekeeping missions in the wider world.

In the following we will discuss a more detailed proposal of this type. It is proposed that NATO and the OECD should be reconstituted as two arms of a new ***World Community of Democratic Nations***:

2. Background

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO lost its original role as bulwark of Western Europe against a possible Soviet attack. Since then it has been slowly developing a new role, remaining as an umbrella organization for the defence of the Atlantic democracies, but now also acting as their "out of area" security and peacekeeping arm, first in Bosnia, then in Afghanistan and Libya. This is entirely consistent with the Community aims outlined above. Members of the EU are still debating whether they should continue to rely on NATO for their collective defence, or establish their own European armed forces.

A number of Eastern European countries have recently joined NATO, which now has 26 members. This puts the old consensus model of decision-making under great strain. At his parting session with the Atlantic Council, General James Jones, the outgoing Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, called for a stronger political structure for NATO[5] : "Sooner or later,

NATO will have to address whether you want 350 committees all acting on the rule of consensus," he said. "What's the logic of one or two countries being able to block action by the remaining 24 members? Why not have a system where they can just opt out?"

Later, a group of five very distinguished military men put forward[6] a '*Grand Strategy*' for renewing NATO, echoing General Jones' call. They were all former chiefs of staff in their respective countries (the US, Britain, France, Germany and Holland), headed by General John Shalikashvili of the US. Among many other suggestions, they demanded a shift in NATO decision-making from consensus to majority voting, and the abolition of national caveats in operational matters. This change alone would transform NATO from a mere alliance into a genuine Community.

Along with new members, many countries further afield have become NATO "Partners", including even Russia itself. It is therefore not a huge step to envision expanding NATO membership to democracies outside the traditional boundaries of Europe and North America. Former Spanish prime minister Aznar advocated just such an expansion[7]. Emphasizing the new threat of Islamist terrorism, he argued that NATO should develop a new dimension of homeland security to counter it, including integration of intelligence information and security services across all the democracies. He thus concluded that stable democracies such as Israel, Japan, and Australia should be invited to join.

Stanley Sloan has argued[8] for an expanded Atlantic Community – and a new Atlantic Community Treaty – to encourage cooperation among all NATO members on non-military aspects of their security. Tiziana Stella[9] summarized the proposals for reform of NATO which were on the table at that time, including

- reform of decision-making procedures;
- enhanced common funding;
- development of a common foreign policy;
- achieving a unified view on the global role of NATO;
- increased cooperation between Atlantic and global institutions.

Many of these changes have also been called for by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Resolution 337), as well as by former NATO commanders. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO members adopted[10] a new "*vision for the Alliance for the next decade: able to defend its members against the full range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and better able to work with other organisations and nations to promote international stability*". This goes some way towards at least the latter two of the proposals listed above.

The OECD is now 50 years old. It began life as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), established in 1947 to implement the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In 1961 it was reborn as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, with the US and Canada as members along with the Europeans. New entries have since raised the membership to 34 countries (see Table I). Russia is now negotiating to become a member.

The current mission of the OECD is to promote policies to improve the economic and social well-being of its members and global society as a whole. It provides a forum where members can discuss common problems, and produces statistics, analyses and forecasts of trends in trade and investment, and recommends policies on the basis of these forecasts. Nevertheless, its importance has diminished somewhat since the glory days of the Marshall Plan.

3. Proposal and Objectives

The proposal then consists of the following basic elements:

• Refocus NATO to give it a global mission, first to guarantee the security and freedom of all its members, and then to act as their security and peacekeeping arm in the wider world, under the aegis of the UN;

- Open membership to stable democracies outside North America and Europe, e.g. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Eventually membership of the Community should be opened to any stable, democratic nation, subject to suitable criteria laid down by the existing member states. In the long run, it is envisaged that the organization will become universal, as democracy spreads to the rest of the globe;

· Alter the dysfunctional decision-making system within NATO, preferably at all levels, to a 'qualified-majority voting with opt-put' system, as advocated by senior military men.[5,6] To avoid indecision and deadlock, decisions on functional matters within the agreed competence of the organization should be made by some form of qualified-majority voting (perhaps with an opt-out clause) – unlike the consensus which is customarily required in NATO today. A theoretical voting system is known as the Penrose voting system or the 'Jagiellonian compromise'[11], which is very similar to the scheme in use by the European Union today[12]. This would transform the alliance into a '*security community*', which might be named the *World Community of Democratic Nations.*

• Add in the OECD, which has a very similar membership, as a second arm of the community to foster development in the more backward members, and provide an economic incentive for new members to join;

• Restructure the organization with appropriate organs of democratic governance, following the pattern established by the European Union:

• A North Atlantic Council already exists, representing the member states. Instead of consensus decision-making, it should adopt a 'qualified majority' voting system, as above.

• A NATO Parliamentary Assembly already exists, as the basis for a democratic chamber, but its official recognition is low;

• A Court needs to be established, to settle differences over the interpretation of the founding treaty, and settle disputes between the member states on the basis of international law. This would form the embryo of an eventual legal system;

• A bureaucracy in Brussels already exists, headed by the Secretary-General, and the regular budget of NATO is about $6 billion per annum – already larger than the UN core budget.

Much as for NATO and the OECD at present, the aims of the Community would include[13]

• to guarantee the security of each member state against external attack;

• to undertake security and peacekeeping operations for its members, under the aegis of the UN;

• to promote mutual economic development;

• to provide a framework which could be used for coordinated action on other common issues, such as global financial stability or global warming;

• More broadly, to serve the common global and diplomatic interests of its members.

Such an association would be much more flexible than the UN, able to change and grow through successive treaties, and could indeed form the nucleus for an eventual system of democratic global governance.

4. Advantages from different viewpoints

Let us look at the advantages of this scheme from several different points of view.

a. NATO

Advantages of the scheme from the point of view of NATO members include

• It would provide a virtually ironclad guarantee against external attack for its members

• It would enable them to share the responsibility, and pool their resources, in carrying out peacekeeping and security operations

• It would cure the dysfunctional decision-making procedure within NATO

• It would provide a new legal framework for settling international disputes between members

• It would give NATO and the OECD an extended and hugely important mission for the future

b. OECD

After implementation of the Marshall Plan was completed, the OEEC/OECD lost its most important role, and has functioned thereafter primarily as a clearing-house for information and policy advice. By taking charge of structural adjustment funds being channelled to the less developed members of the Community, the OECD would gain a new function of major importance, very similar to its original role under the Marshall Plan.

c. UN

Acting in tandem with the UN, the new Community could bring important advantages

• Acting strictly at the behest of the Security Council, the Community would provide a powerful means of enforcement for the resolutions of the Security Council. It would play a role very like that originally envisaged for a standing security force under Article 47 of the UN Charter

• The new Community could quite easily set up rapid reaction units to carry out the role advocated for UNEPS, the proposed UN Emergency Peace Service

Thus the UN and the Community together would make up a strengthened and more effective system of common security and international governance.

d. USA

One of the Republican contenders for the U.S. Presidency in 2008, John McCain, caused quite a stir when he proposed the formation of a '*League of Democracies'* in order to build an enduring peace based on freedom[14]. "We Americans must be willing to listen to the collective will of our democratic allies," he said. On the Democratic side, Ivo Daalder, formerly the U.S. Permanent Representative on the Council of NATO, together with James Lindsay, proposed a '*Concert of Democracies'* in order to form an "international institution capable of prompt and effective action both to prevent, and where necessary respond to threats to international security."[15]

The idea of a Concert of Democracies was also promoted in an authoritative, bipartisan report from the Princeton Project[16], *"Forging a World of Liberty under Law'' '*in 2006. So it seems there is support for such ideas from both sides of politics in the U.S.[17] The Obama administration has been anxious to strengthen multilateral institutions and seek more cooperation with America's friends and allies.

Even in the later days of the Bush administration there were moves in this direction. "Unilateralism is out, effective multilateralism is in," said David Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.[18] "The hope is to see NATO as the core of a global security community," according to Victoria Nuland, U.S. Ambassador to NATO at the time.[19]

Thus the main advantage for the US would be the opportunity to share with its partners the burden and responsibility of acting as 'global policeman', which no single nation has the right to assume in any case. In these times of financial stringency, the cost is a major consideration. In recent years, the astronomical cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus an expenditure on armaments roughly equivalent to the rest of the world put together, has taken a heavy toll on the US budget, so that the national debt now stands around 100% of GDP. Action to cut costs needs to be taken urgently, and sharing more of the security burden would help enormously. A move towards shared responsibility and collective security is clearly the right thing to do in any case.

The fact that spokesmen on both sides of US politics have advocated similar ideas indicates that a scheme of this sort should have a good chance of acceptance in the US, and if the US leads the way, the other member states of NATO and the OECD are very likely to follow.

e. Europe

Europeans have already had long experience with transnational cooperation through the EU. The Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, is very much in favour of multilateral cooperation, as is the President of France, Francois Hollande. An ex-prime-minister of France, Edouard Balladur, has gone so far as to suggest a full union between the USA and Europe to deal with the full range of global foreign policy issues.[20]

Despite this, the Europeans have apparently been very wary of the idea of a 'global NATO', being fearful of being dragged into neo-imperialist adventures under the dominance of the United States. A qualified majority voting scheme would answer these fears, however, since the US would then have the largest voice, but by no means a dominant voice, in the councils of the Community. The introduction of qualified majority voting would give the Europeans a full voice in the decisions of the Community.

Establishment of the Community would probably settle the long-running debate as to whether Europe should build up its own armed forces for external defence. Europe would be able to rely on the Community for its external defence, and thereby save a considerable amount of money.

f. Australia

Australia provides an example of a nation which might become a new member of such a global community. Australia's security is already guaranteed, effectively, by the ANZUS alliance with the US. Australian military leaders tend to recoil with horror at the suggestion that Australia should join NATO, presumably because of the dysfunctional decision-making system there. This would hopefully be cured by a qualified majority voting system.

Australia is already a NATO Partner in any case, and has contributed the largest non-NATO contingent of troops in Afghanistan. Full membership in the Community would give Australia a voice at the 'top table', and allow it to play a significant part in the emerging system of democratic international governance.

As with the Europeans, there are fears within Australia of being dragged into neo-imperialist adventures at the chariot wheels of the US. This is exemplified by the recent book *'Dangerous Allies'* from ex-prime minister Malcolm Fraser, which calls for Australia to pull back from the US alliance and take a more independent stance.[21] Adherence to the new Community would solve this problem, and allow Australia to participate in a more constructive and forward-looking system of collective security.

g. The global perspective

The world's people, regardless of nationality, face enormous common problems:

- the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD;

- global warming and other environmental damage;

- instability of the world's financial system;

- famine, disease, and war, especially in the Third World; and

- widespread human rights violations,

  among others.

The present UN system has had remarkable successes, but it is too weak to deal with these problems effectively. They can only be properly resolved if the peoples of the world work together to construct a system of democratic global governance and binding international law. A World Community of Democratic Nations would provide a very suitable starting point for the gradual evolution of such a system.

h. Atlanticists

In his book *Union Now*, Clarence Streit3 advocated a full federal union of democracies in 1939 to combat Nazism. The movement he began – originally called Federal Union, Inc., and later the Association to Unite the Democracies (AUD) – continued after WWII as a means to combat Communism. The Streit Council continues to advocate a union of democratic nations today as a stage along the way towards eventual democratic world federation. But a full union is not going to be achieved in a single giant bound. James Huntley has published an article[22] in *'Freedom and Union'* arguing for a Community of Democracies as a preliminary step towards a Union, along very similar lines to ours.

AUD's main focus was always on NATO, the alliance of the Atlantic democracies against the Soviet Union. Merging the OECD with NATO would transform it into an economic community as well. The OECD has a very similar membership to NATO, though somewhat broader, including, for example, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Creation of a

Community of the democracies would be the logical first step in an evolutionary process which could eventually lead to a union or even a federation of the democracies, proceeding at whatever pace might suit the member states.

i. World Federalists

The world federalist viewpoint has been outlined in the Introduction. Advantages of the scheme are then:

- It would provide a foundation which could evolve and grow freely towards an eventual world federation, following the strategy of Jean Monnet
- It would generate a more powerful and effective *global security community*, able to work alongside the UN to maintain world peace

5. Possible Problems

a. Polarization of the international community

Non-member states of the new Community may feel excluded, and suspicious of the motives behind it. If the Community interfered in their affairs, they would feel resentful, and would tend to regard the Community as an "enemy", creating a split between "us" and "them". Such a polarization of the international community should be avoided at all costs.

Thus it would be important to make overtures to non-members, as the far-seeing Harmel Report recommended for NATO many years ago. It should be emphasized that membership of the Community is open to all countries, provided only that they satisfy suitable criteria for democratic governance and peaceful relations with their neighbours.

Furthermore, The Community should guarantee never to undertake a military intervention in a non-member country, unless authorized to do so by the Security Council of the UN. This might be a somewhat contentious issue in some quarters in the US, for instance, because it would place restrictions on the role the Community could play in serving US interests. It would even give Russia and China a veto over the external interventions of the Community. But in fact such a policy is obligatory under international law, as laid down in the UN Charter (Articles 2 & 42). It would also allay fears in Russia and China that the new Community was aimed against them.

Finally, significant economic inducements should be offered to new members to join the Community. The European Union has shown the way to achieve this. Substantial amounts of 'structural adjustment' funds should be channelled through the OECD arm of the Community towards the less developed member states, to bring their standard of living up to par with other members under the principle of *'solidarity'*. The non-member states would be motivated to join in order to access these funds.

b. Conflict with the role of the UN

A related problem is that the Community might be seen as competing with the role of the UN, in that both would be global security organizations. It will be vitally important to demonstrate that the Community would function in a manner complementary to, rather than competing with the UN. Again, the Community should only intervene in a non-member state at the behest of the Security Council. The forces at the Community's disposal would then provide powerful reinforcement to the decisions of the Security Council. In fact, they would effectively supply the place of the standing armed forces originally envisaged for the UN under Article 47 of the Charter.

Furthermore, it would be no great step for the new Community to set up rapid reaction units to fill the role suggested for UNEPS, the United Nations Emergency Peace Service, which has been advocated by numerous NGOs for some time. The Community could quite easily fill this role in an effective manner. It might also set up a Reconstruction and Reconciliation Commission to help restore stable governance to failed states following a UN intervention.

In summary, far from conflicting with the role of the UN, the new Community would fit in very neatly as the Security Council's strong right arm.

c. Forcing 'Western' values on other cultures

It might be charged that requiring democracy of new members is tantamount to forcing Western ideas of government onto what is meant to be a global community. But that is not a sustainable argument. Government "of the people, by the people, for the people" is a universal concept, not a purely Western one, and the thriving democracies in Japan and India are convincing examples of this. As more non-Western members join the Community, these fears should quickly be allayed.

d. Mismatch between memberships of NATO & OECD

This problem is discussed in the following section. It should not be a major difficulty.

6. Further Details

a. Membership

The countries who are members of NATO and the OECD are compared in Table I. There is a large overlap between them: Some 22 countries are members of both organizations. There are 6 countries which are members of NATO but not the OECD, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. On the other hand, there are 12 countries which are members of the OECD but not NATO, namely Australia, Austria, Chile, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland.

If both organizations were linked together as components of a Community under a common Supreme Council, the question immediately arises whether all members of one organization should automatically become members of the other organization? A little thought shows otherwise.

Several members of the OECD are neutrals, including Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland. Japan has a well-known clause in its Constitution forbidding the formation of armed forces. These countries may well not want to join NATO - or on the other hand, they might be happy to join a new global security community guaranteeing the security of all in common.

Australia and New Zealand, by contrast, are not now members because they lie outside the North Atlantic area, but they are Partner members of NATO, and have participated in recent NATO operations. Australia, for instance, supplied the largest contingent of non-NATO troops in the recent conflict in Afghanistan. They would be natural candidates to join the new 'globalized' NATO, and may well wish to do so.

Table I. *A list of member countries belonging to NATO and the OECD. Membership is indicated by a cross.*

Country	NATO	OECD
Albania	X	
Australia		X
Austria	(neutral)	X
Belgium	X	X
Bulgaria	X	
Canada	X	X
Croatia	X	
Chile		X
Czech Republic	X	X
Denmark	X	X
Estonia	X	X
Finland	(neutral)	X

France	X	X
Germany	X	X
Greece	X	X
Hungary	X	X
Iceland	X	X
Ireland	**(neutral)**	X
Israel		X
Italy	X	X
Japan	**(neutral)**	X
Latvia	X	
Lithuania	X	
Korea		X
Luxembourg	X	X
Mexico		X
Netherlands	X	X
New Zealand		X
Norway	X	X
Poland	X	X
Portugal	X	X
Romania	X	
Slovak Republic	X	X
Slovenia	X	X
Spain	X	X
Sweden	**neutral**	X
Switzerland	**neutral**	X
Turkey	X	X
United Kingdom	X	X
United States	X	X
Totals	**28**	**34**

tool by ammap.com

NATO and OECD Members | OECD Members Only | NATO Members Only

Israel is a more contentious case. Since the Community would be guaranteeing the security of its member states, it would not want to be instantly embroiled in the middle-East conflict. It might be argued that Israel should settle the Palestinian question, in a manner which satisfies the reasonable aspirations of both Israelis and Palestinians, before it is allowed to join.

Thus it appears that *new members of both NATO and the OECD should only be admitted on a case-by-case basis, as at present*. If funds were channelled through the OECD for structural development of the less developed members, it would certainly be a strong incentive for all members to join the OECD, at least. As mentioned previously, it would also provide a strong inducement for new members to join the Community as a whole.

The further question then arises, how could the Supreme Council operate, if some members belong to NATO, for instance, and others do not? This could be handled easily enough. If the Supreme Council was discussing matters concerning NATO, then non-member countries would simply not be given a vote on the matter at hand. They might be present as observers, but would not be entitled to cast a vote on that specific matter. This might cause some bureaucratic difficulties – but that is what bureaucrats are for!

b. Voting System

If the Community did adopt a qualified majority voting system for decision-making, how should it work? The theoretical answer to this question is well-known, and was first discussed by Lionel Penrose[11] in 1946. The European Union has dealt with the problem at a practical level in the Council of Ministers, and while the Penrose scheme was never formally adopted, the Union has arrived at a very similar result on purely pragmatic grounds, as illustrated in Figure 1.

The basic problem runs as follows: supposing an international council consists of representatives from many nations of very different sizes or populations, how should one allot relative voting weights to each representative? The simplest and most natural scheme would seem to allot a voting weight W proportional to the population P of the country he or she represents. Bu this turns out not to be the ideal scheme. Under that formula, the larger countries always dominate the voting. The smaller countries can vote how they please, they will never affect the outcome. Their "voting power" is zero, in the technical jargon.[23]

Figure 1. *Number of votes W allotted to each member state in the European Council of Ministers as a function of population P (in millions), according to the Treaty of Nice. Germany is the largest state with 82 million, Malta the smallest with 410,000. The ideal Penrose formula is shown as a dashed line (W proportional to square root of P).*

Penrose showed that the 'correct' weighting system was to take the weight W proportional to the *square root* of the population P (see Figure 1). He considered each vote as analogous to the result of a scientific measurement, repeated many times. If the errors in the measurements are purely random, one can show that averaging over N measurements produces a more accurate answer, where the expected error in the average decreases like one over the square root of N. A similar

thing happens in opinion polls, where the expected error in the poll decreases like one over the square root of the number of people surveyed (e,g. a poll of 1000 people gives an expected error of about one over square root one thousand, or about 3%). Applying this to the voting system, in the absence of any *a priori* information, one expects the 'error' in each country's vote to go like one over square root P, and therefore it should be given a relative weighting proportional to square root P.

This system was proposed for use in the Council of Ministers of the European Union by Poland and Sweden, but never formally adopted. Nevertheless, on purely pragmatic grounds the Europeans have arrived at a weighting system which is remarkably similar to the Penrose model. It gives the smaller countries a bigger vote than one might naively think they are entitled to. This is illustrated in Figure 1.

In the case of the proposed NATO/OECD community, there is one further consideration. The US has traditionally acted as the principal paymaster of NATO, and hence is used to calling the shots: "he who pays the piper calls the tune". Hence it would probably be best to adopt a relative weighting formula where the yardstick is not population P, but the size of each nation's financial contribution to the organization C, or in other words take W proportional to square root C. This does not have the same 'mathematical' justification as the Penrose formula, but it means the US would continue to have the biggest say, although not a dominant say, within the community. This is only a fair reflection of its power and influence in the world, and would continue to hold true even if India, say, were admitted as a member of the Community.

c. Provisions for Opting Out

It has been suggested[5,6] that when the old system of making decisions by consensus is replaced by a qualified majority voting system, member nations should be given the right to opt out of any program or operation that they find strongly repugnant. If a new intervention was being discussed by NATO, for instance, which attracted a majority vote in favour but was strongly opposed by one particular member nation, then that member would have the right to opt out of that particular operation. This would mean that it would not have to contribute funds, men or materiel to that particular operation, and conversely, would have no say or voting rights in further discussions of that operation at any level.

Note that this situation is very unlikely to occur, if the Community were implementing a decision of the Security Council, because all UN members are obliged to carry out decisions of the Security Council under Article 25 of the Charter.

This would mean that a single country would no longer be able to *veto* a decision by the Community, but it would not be forced to take part in a Community operation if it was strongly opposed to it. Member nations would be less fearful of losing sovereignty to the new Community, and thus be more inclined to approve the new scheme. On the other hand, one nation opting out of a program would no doubt cause all sorts of administrative difficulties, and should not be made too easy. One possibility is that before the opt-out takes effect, the nation's

parliament should be required to approve it by a majority vote. That should ensure that an opt-out would be a relatively rare occurrence.

7. Conclusions

The new Community would bring many benefits. It would cure some of the major problems within the present NATO system. It would produce a powerful new global security community, which acting in tandem with the Security Council would be a strong force for peace and freedom in the world.

Spokesmen on both sides of politics in the US have put forward similar schemes, so there is a good chance that a plan of this sort would be acceptable to the USA. The Europeans would most likely be happy to follow, and so the proposal should have a good chance of being implemented.

If the Community is open to new members, subject to suitable criteria of democracy and peaceful relations with their neighbours, then one can envisage many new members joining up, attracted by the prospect of new structural adjustment funds coming their way. The membership could soon include the majority of the world's nations, as more countries become democratic. Eventually, one may hope that membership in the Community would become universal. About two new countries have become 'fully free' every year for the past thirty years, according to Freedom House.[24]

With the addition of a Court, and the adoption of qualified majority voting, the association would become a community on the European model. It would provide a convenient forum for discussion and the making of common policy on matters beyond the security sphere, including trade, finance and the environment. In time to come, one can envisage the Community evolving into a full-blown system of democratic global governance.

Notes and References

1. Hans Morgenthau, "Politics Among Nations" (5th edition) (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1973)

2. Website at http://www.dwfed.org/

3. Clarence K. Streit, "Union Now" (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1939).

4. A 'Community of Democracies' already exists, but its purpose is merely to promote the concept of democracy itself, and it does not fill the role we envisage here.

5. James Jones, "Stronger Political Structures for NATO", *Freedom and Union* 2, no.1 (2007):10-11.

6. Klaus Naumann et al., *Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World –*

Renewing Transatlantic Partnership, 2007, accessed April 24, 2011, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/documents/3eproefGrandStrat(b).pdf

7. Jose Maria Aznar, *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom*, RUSI 151, no.4 (2006),

http://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=articles_journal&ref=A44DCA72D99D0C.

8. Stanley Sloan. "Taking the Atlantic Community beyond NATO Transformation." *Freedom and Union* 1, no.2 (2006): 6.

9. Tiziana Stella, "Global Threats, Atlantic Structures." *Freedom & Union* 1, no.2 (2006): 9-15.

10. Lisbon Summit Declaration (2010) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm

11. L.S. Penrose, 'The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 109, 53 (1946); W. Slomczynski and K. Zyczkowski, 'Penrose Voting System and Optimal Quota', Acta Physica Polonica B37, 3133 (2006); 'Voting in the European Union: The Square Root System of Penrose and a Critical Point', Acta Physica Polonica B37, 3133 (2006). (Check!)

12. Voting would no doubt be an evolutionary adaptation, as it was in the EU, with consensus remaining the usual *modus operandi* for years and voting used as a last resort when consensus seems unduly blocked. Experience from EU history shows that simply having this option legally in reserve, even if rarely used, serves to make it easier to reach prompt consensus decisions that have real substance; it puts obstructionists on notice that they could lose their chance to bargain for realistic compromises if they do not use it.

13. The first three of these goals are in the NATO Treaty, Articles II, IV, and V. The last three are permissible under the Treaty but not mandated. The fourth and fifth have been taken up gradually by NATO since 1991. The last in principle already exists, broadening NATO from a security alliance into a general purpose diplomatic community; it was embraced by NATO in the 1990s. NATO's limitations have never been for want of sufficient goals, but for want sometimes of sufficient instruments and procedures to carry them out. In the 1950s NATO appointed a committee of three 'Wise Men' to develop means of implementing its goals of closer political and economic cooperation. While their report was officially adopted by NATO by consensus, only some portions of it were put into practice. The economic implementation was deliberately left to a separate organization, the OECD, Formed at the beginning of the 1960s as the successor to the implementing structures of the Marshall Plan; the OECD was able to include neutral European democracies, and bring in four Pacific allies: Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. The Atlantic world thereby took on a dual, split-level identity: the Atlantic-only level and the Atlantic-Pacific level, or 'Atlanticism' and 'Trilateralism'.

14. John McCain. "McCain Remarks", Hoover Institution‖ (speech, Stanford

University, Stanford, CA, May 1, 2007), accessed April 28, 2010, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/McCain_05-01-07.pdf.

15. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, ''Democracies of the World, Unite''', *The*

American Interest 2, no. 3 (2007): 5-15,accessed April 28, 2011, http://www.theamerican-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=220.

16. *"Forging a World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st Century",* Final Paper of the Princeton Project on National Security (G. John Ikenberry and Ann-Marie Slaughter, Co-Directors)

http://www.princeton.edu/~ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf

17. It might be thought that the U.S. Congress would be against voting in NATO as a threat to national sovereignty. However, this has not been the case. When approving the previous round of expansion of NATO membership, Congress adopted a resolution calling for exploration of moving away from consensus in NATO. The resolution was watered down to mere exploration, because the State Department opposed the resolution and felt the consensus system was working well. To be sure, there would undoubtedly be an opt out provision, so the issue is one of pooling only a small part of sovereignty -- probably less than the other members pool already in the NATO Integrated Command -- yet an important part of it, as it lies in the military and foreign policy sphere. Apparently Americans do not have the same hyper-sensitivity about loss of sovereignty when it comes to NATO, a grouping of fellow advanced democracies, as when it comes to UN-level institutions.

18. Quoted by Vince Crawley, "State's Fried Says NATO Not Counterweight' to United Nations,' *U.S. Department of State International Information Programs,* May 3, 2006.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/05/mil-060503-usia02.htm.

19. Quoted by Frederick Kempe, "NATO, Israel Draw Closer," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 14, 2006, accessed: April 29, 2011,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113987680406772930.html?mod=world_news_featured_articles </a%3E.

20. His main immediate proposal is to upgrade U.S.-EU summits into a U.S.-EU Council; at the same time he advocates reform of NATO and specification of rules for using NATO resources without consensus among the allies. See: Edouard Balladur. *Pour une Union occidentale entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis* (Paris: Fayard, 2007).

21. Cain Roberts and Malcolm Fraser, *'Dangerous Allies'* (Melbourne University Publishing, 2014)

22. James Huntley, "The Democratic Peace," *Freedom and Union* 4, no.2 (2010): 11-19.

23. J.F. Banzhaf*, 'Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis'*, Rutgers Law Review 19, 317 (1965).

24. '*Freedom in the World'*, annual report published by Freedom House,

http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports