

Global Integration as an Antidote to Crisis

Cornelia Beyer

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Cornelia Beyer is a Senior Lecturer and the Deputy Director for the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull. Since 2010 her research has focused on political psychology as applied to international relations, and in 2017 she published a monograph titled *International Political Psychology: Explorations into a new discipline* (Palgrave).

I agree with Alexander Wendt that a world state is inevitable in the long run. [1] But how long it will be to its realization, that is entirely another question. Alex mentioned to me in personal communication it would be maybe 200 years. That might be a sensible estimate, or it might be too short term. We don't know. It is always difficult for political scientists to predict the future. We have failed to predict the end of the Cold War as well as 9/11. However, like science fiction authors, scientists are capable of helping form the future in the long haul. Immanuel Kant, for example, with his thought on the Perpetual Peace helped form the ideas that led to the creation of the League of Nations, and later the United Nations. Immanuel Kant, for example, with his thought on the Perpetual Peace helped form the ideas that led to the creation of the League of Nations, and later the United Nations. He's also behind the ideas that led to the thought on and creation of the European Communities, later the European Union. Both have been quite successful in maintaining the peace in the world. The European Union more obviously so for us in the West, but in the rest of the world, the United Nations too is given more credit for peace than we in the West usually assign to it. [2] Kant was not the only one who thought about Perpetual Peace, even though he is usually connected to it. [3] Abbe de Saint Pierre, Montesquieu and Rousseau also worked on ideas relating to the perpetual peace, which were prominent in the time Kant wrote his works (the 18th century). However, only some of them made it to influence our thought today. Kant warned against a world state, as he believed it would lead to despotism and oppression. [4] He believed in a federation of states, something more alike to the UN and the European Union today, even though the EU is an entity *sui generis*, something in between a state and a union of states.

In this article, I will develop some ideas and take up some ideas that have been brought forward since Kant wrote his seminal books and apply them to the idea of global integration as the basis for a world state. Some of these ideas are openly supportive, others put forth challenges. I will then present some ideas how the balance of power and related thinking, inherent in Realism, that challenges the possibilities of successful integration and hence the creation of a world state, can be overcome by creating good relations, which give forth to absolute gains seeking instead of relative gains seeking as the basis of harmony. [5] And I will finally argue that even the scourge of today, transnational terrorism, can theoretically at least be addressed by replacing exclusion

and deprivation with integration and development, the latter of which are necessary elements for building the bedrocks of a world state.

Integration as a step towards the World State

I argued in my article 'Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower' that global integration is necessary to achieve global peace. That idea was heavily influenced by my readings of Institutionalists, such as by Volker Rittberger [6] (a teacher of mine), as well as by integration theorists such as David Mitrany and Emanuel Adler [7]. Integration goes hand in hand with inclusion. This means that integration by spreading our political systems on the international basis and our economic methods on the transnational basis is not enough (if it is even desirable and if it ever can be fully achieved) [8]. It also means that we need to include other states in the global institutions that we, in particular the United States, created. It was probably a mistake not to include Germany and Russia in the negotiations for the Treaty of Versailles, and it was a mistake not to include them in the League of Nations later on, even if they finally joined. [9] Similarly, while we have near global membership in the United Nations, we need to broaden the other global institutions in their membership. One most controversial example is NATO. John Ikenberry warned against a global NATO. [10] However, I believe that it would be beneficial to broaden the membership of NATO and in particular attempt to include Russia in it. From Russia's point of view NATO is a threat to its security. The crisis in Ukraine, for example, can partially be explained with this threat perception. An inclusion in NATO would help reduce the threat and would bring Russia closer to the West. The final goal would be to transform NATO to a global organization, which would present a military dimension to the United Nations system. This would pose its own challenges, such as how to act if a conflict would break out amongst some of its members. But here some methods could be devised to render NATO not incapable of action in such a case. For example, as today, the United Nations Security Council could be given oversight on decisions relating to intervention in conflicts. A country that would be involved in a conflict could be asked to cease its veto power in the Security Council for that particular event, so the council could still act and would not be blocked as it was in the Cold War. Furthermore, a more integrated Russia and other states would possibly put less opposition towards common decisions in the first place. With more responsibility comes more accountability, and that could render such states more willing to cooperate in these institutions.

Another issue to think about would be that there is a need to make the Security Council more representative of the world. The current veto powers are not representing the power distribution globally. For example, it has been suggested that the UK and France give up their permanent seats for one common EU seat. [11] Also, the inclusion of new permanent members needs to be thought about, with special attention to the BRICs countries. However, maybe the conflicts would not be too stark: An inclusive NATO could give rise to a broadened common identity, and with shared identity come shared interests. Shared interests mean prospects for peace. [12] A more democratic and inclusive UN and a broadened NATO could arguably help make these institutions more legitimate and effective, and thereby help pacify the world.

Finally, a more integrated and inclusive world authority would need to increasingly base its legitimacy on the peoples of the world. Even if Robert Keohane laments a missing global demos [13], I believe it is increasingly developing, in particular with the spread of the internet. It is

there in embryonic form. For basing global institutions on a firm democratic basis, we would need a United Nations Parliament, something that has long been called for by some groups. A United Nations Parliament would function like the European Parliament. Europe overall could function, as some termed it, the greenhouse for a more inclusive United Nations.

The Challenges and How to Address Them

These global institutions that would present an emerging world state could be blocked by different interests relating to various topics. One of these will be terrorism, another will be climate change, yet another will be gender politics. All of these, and many more, are very controversial between various states in the world and a more integrated international political systems runs the risk of becoming a center of dissent and conflict. It runs the risk of being blocked by such conflicts like the United Nations Security Council has been in the Cold War period. This is shown in examples such as the inability of the United Nations to find a common definition of terrorism as of today. Or the inability of the world to agree on measures against climate change. Gender policies, which are widely divergent between some Western states and some developing states, would be also a major issue of contention and would reflect something similar to a cultural clash. [14] It would be very difficult to overcome these differences without crisis or deadlock. But the question is if it would need more or less integration to deal with these differences successfully?

In my opinion, more integration would be better, if it based was on more inclusive terms. Inclusion means to make the global institutions, including the United Nations system, more democratic and more representative, as described above. This would allow for the diverging interests increasingly being solved not by 'going it alone' and conflict, but rather by democratic means. Democracies, however, need time to establish themselves successfully. We have seen that at the case of Germany, where it went absurdly wrong after an early start. Similarly to the European Union it is therefore important to take phased steps, in accordance with pragmatism and calculations of what is possible at any given time. The theorists of the European Union proclaimed that spill over processes would lead from one step forward to the next logical step over time. And even given the current crisis in Europe, Europe is the greatest success model for successful integration after the United States themselves. Increased inclusion would not necessarily have to bring forth political overload, as a system of democratic subsidiarity could be implemented, as described by Hoeffe. [15]

The question this raises is if integration can happen without crisis. Randall Schweller just wrote a very important book [16] , in which he argued that there would in all likelihood be a crisis before a reform of the outdated global institutions would come about. We have seen many crises in history which were followed by deepened integration. So, in one sense this is a hopeful statement. Similarly to World War I and II that brought about the League of Nations and the United Nations respectively, we could hope that another crisis could bring about stronger global institutions. But the question is: do we really need a crisis for that to happen? Does the patient really need to get ill before he can get better? It is possible that this could be avoided, and of course this would be the better course of events. The question then would be what is needed to prevent further crisis?

Schweller suggests Big Data is the answer. I agree with that partially. Increased knowledge is certainly a helpful tool to prevent crises. I argued in one previous paper that the global institutions need to collaborate more closely with NGOs. NGOs can serve as a thermometer for the world's problems. [17] Crises represent pressures on the system. Growing pressures might mean that a larger crisis develops, which destroys the system and allows it to be restructured so that the pressures can be dealt with more efficiently. But pressures need not turn into pressures that destroy the system. Pressures early addressed and managed well can be relieved before they build up in a threatening way. In the last part of this paper, I will reflect on what can be done to address the pressure posed by radical Islam, to help prevent it building into such a pressure and in the worst case scenario developing into a Huntington'sque Clash of Civilizations. [18] Sometimes, more political will is needed and more change is better than less. With the topic in question, we tend to believe in less rather than more change as the safer alternative. However, if the pressures have already built up sufficiently, as I argue they have for example with climate change and global disparities in wealth, more change might be the safer way of action. Finally, knowledge about the present and the future is as important as knowledge about the past. The European Union was so successful because it remembered the horrors of the last war so vividly. And it made efforts not to repeat them. [19]

Before I turn towards that topic in the third part of this paper, I want to reflect on the possibility of integration from an IR perspective. For integration to happen, we need to overcome balance of power dynamics and thinking. This is possible, I argue, if good relations are established. Good relations will give rise to absolute gains seeking instead of relative gains seeking, hence an end to balance of power.

Interpretation from IR Theory

It might be possible to overcome the problems that marked international relations and still mark them today by integrating the world more. Balance of power politics have been traditionally blamed by Liberals to be responsible for any lack of cooperation and integration that we might observe. We could argue, if we understand that Realism is an approach that describes conflict and Liberalism an approach that described peace, that we can move from Realism to Liberalism, from conflict to peace, with more integration. Balance of power mechanisms do not need to be disruptive to global integration, as I will explain below.

Realism is divided into defensive and offensive realism. Defensive realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, claim that states pursue only as much power as their significant others. [20] They don't want to dominate the international system but merely to be able to survive. Offensive realism, proposed by John Mearsheimer, challenges this perspective and maintains that states want to dominate the international system, at least to the point of becoming a regional hegemon. [21] This is because, if they dominate, they will be secure from threats, as no other state will dare to challenge the hegemon. Defensive realists caution against this view, arguing that hegemony gives rise to balancing and counter-power. Other states will do all they can to hold the hegemon in check. The international system strives for equilibrium. While I don't want to challenge this point of Mearsheimer's, I will address some of his other assumptions. In response to these assumptions, I will make the following points:

1. States pursue absolute gains first, then relative gains.
2. Relative gains are pursued in response to threats, not generally.
3. Acquiring latent power requires states to cooperate, making cooperation inherently necessary, even for defensive realists.
4. Balancing does take place, and not only between major powers, but also at other levels of analysis, and in other areas of international affairs.
5. Balancing will be mitigated by good relations. When relations are good, balancing does not need to occur.

I will go through these points in the order that they are presented here.

1. The priority of absolute gains

I like to think of power as control. For me, control captures better what states are after. Power for me only describes the resources that states want. States want power, yes, but for what purpose? The purpose of power is control over themselves and their environment. Jonathan Haidt [22] observes in his musings on happiness that control is a fundamental factor for happiness. I believe that this describes a general human need, and also a need that applies to states. What do states want to control? If we apply Maslow's hierarchy of needs [23], we can assume that survival is the first goal of control. Structural realists are therefore right to argue that the imperative is survival. [24] For me, this is why states prioritize absolute gains in terms of the efficiency of the economy and the state. If we look at failed states, they are threatened more by internal problems and economic dysfunction than by external threats. And I believe that this holds for other states also. If the stability of the state cannot be ensured, a state won't be able to compete internationally. The Soviet Union towards the end of the Cold War provides an example of this. The Soviet Union ended its competition with the United States because it experienced severe internal economic and political distress. [25] It needed to focus on absolute gains first, before it could even think of engaging in competition again.

2. Relative gains are pursued in response to threats.

Relative gains are pursued when the application of force is possible, when states are under threat. They are not pursued generally. The pursuit of absolute gains is possible when no threats are posed towards the state. [26] Realists argue that all states at any time are under threat from each other, but this is not always the case. Consider the European Union or Switzerland for example. These states are pursuing mainly economic gains, not military ones, which contradicts the predictions of realism. Economic gains cannot be understood here as latent power. Mearsheimer sees economic power as latent power. He argues that latent or economic power is solely pursued for military purposes, as the basis for military armament. But neither the EU nor Switzerland maintains a large army. So, my point is, that under threat, yes, military arms races and relative gains seeking are the norms. But when no direct threat is perceived, absolute gains might dominate the agendas of states.

3. Cooperation is natural

My third point is that, in order to gain latent power, states will need to cooperate. This contradicts the logic of realism, which considers the possibilities of cooperation to be limited. However, it assumes that states are fundamentally interested in latent power, economic wealth, and pursue this along with military armament. However, in today's world economic growth is not possible without significant international cooperation. Wealth depends on being integrated into the international system. China, for example, would not have attained its current position, nor will it realize the future that many predict, without relying substantially on exports and hence trade cooperation with other countries. It also has substantial financial ties to other countries. [27] The same goes for the US, the EU, and all other great powers in the international system. Economically isolated states cannot build latent power, and thereby they undermine their position in international power competition. This means that the realist logic depends on the liberal logic of interdependence and trade. Without considering the importance of interdependence and trade, states will not be able to compete. The balance of power logic is therefore counterbalanced by a more liberal logic of interdependence that mitigates the security dilemma and creates zones of peace.

4. Balancing takes place at many levels.

This point is probably the most supportive of Mearsheimer as it argues for the reality of balancing. However, I argue that balancing takes place not only between great powers, but also at many other levels in the multidimensional chessboard that Joseph Nye has described. [28] For instance, states balance each other economically. The world economy is one of competition, and states want to grow at the expense of others. This competition, however, is largely contained within the economic realm. Sub-state actors such as Al Qaeda and lately ISIL also engage in untraditional military balancing. While they can never hope to equal the US in military capabilities, they seek to increase their power relative to their opponents, so that they can at least inflict damage. Indeed, balancing is a mechanism which has been described in many different areas, at the level of national politics, and even at the private level in romantic couples. Sociologists and political scientist alike are interested in the balance of power.

5. Balancing does not need to occur if relations are good.

The EU does not balance against the US. It would, however, if relations with the US were to deteriorate (as we have seen in the wake of the latest Iraq intervention [29]). But, at present, it does not. It simply tries to build its economic power. Balancing does not need to occur when relations are good and when no threats are perceived. This follows from the points made above. Only when threats are perceived, and control is therefore endangered, will states start to balance militarily. Therefore, we can move from a world that is marked by Realism and balance of power and the pursuit of relative gains, security dilemmas and zero sum games to a world that is marked by democratic practices and trade and integration and positive sum games. We need to rethink our security practices and think global, however.

How to address current problems?

We can apply Maslow's theory of needs also to states and violent sub-state actors. States, and terrorists, like other people, have needs that they must satisfy. The drive to life (may according to Freud be understood as the life instinct) means they will try to satisfy these needs to survive and be content (i.e. not in upheaval, civil war or revolution, but stable). For states, as the resources to satisfy these needs however are usually limited, they are at least sometimes in competition with each other. This leads to the prospect of failure and to failure (which results in fear), as well as to success and the prospect of success (which might lead to aggression). This fear and aggression also determine that other phenomena arise, such as the security dilemma, deterrence and such. As states vary in their success and failure, they will establish hierarchies. Security dilemmas and deterrence might keep these short term stable. But hierarchies and structures are not long-term stable, they are usually long-term mobile. Sometimes, they are medium-term mobile, as we have seen with the case of Germany over the past century. Sometimes they are in constant turmoil, as we currently see various crises around the world. This depends first on intervening factors, factors that are outside of the control of states, such as nature, the environment, unintended consequences of actions, and varied human ingenuity. These all might lead to increasing or decreasing capacities of states, and this might lead some states or sub-state actors to be able to rise and others to be challenged and in the extreme possibly to decline. The general assumption is that leading powers vigorously defend the status quo. However, leading powers are not necessarily pure status quo powers. They might be interested in keeping their security and their dominance. But they might as well be interested in improving the situation of the lesser powers. How else would we describe attempts at widespread democratization and attempts at the spread of development? Leading powers realize that their security and dominance depends on growth and survival of lesser ones. Otherwise, they will be challenged by those who can afford it. I think, this can be observed at the current case of the US hegemony, which is extremely interested in pushing democracy and a certain economic system, which it genuinely believes brings progress and prosperity. Although the current US President publicized his determination to keep the United States militarily the leading state, nowhere is an indication to be found that growth, and therefore change, is not desired. And even in the military sphere cooperation, training and calls to Europe to increase its capabilities in this sphere were repeatedly made. In conclusion, we need to take the idea of status quo oriented states not too literally.

Psychologists also claim that we all have a prejudiced view of ourselves. We think ourselves right even in the face of opposition and rather assume the other side wrong than to doubt of own standpoint. [30] This kind of egocentric prejudice is common amongst nearly all humans and taken to the extreme is the common ideology that any political violence is based on. If we apply this to states it means that it is difficult to overcome conflict as it is difficult to come to mutual understanding, which is thought by psychologists to be the basis of harmony. Real efforts need to be made to take in the other side's point of view, which might seem difficult, painful or even counterintuitive.

Examples can be given in current affairs. Trying to put ourselves in the shoes of Russia or the Islamic fighters might be counterintuitive and seem foolish and dangerous. But it might mean we have to consider options otherwise not seen, such as thinking about including Russia in the worlds important institutions, such as in particular thinking about opening up the doors of NATO, which in Russia is seen as a substantial threat to its sphere of influence and security, particularly with repeated enlargements. Likewise, we have to listen to Islamist fighters and

understand what motivates them. And apart from religious rhetoric they very often do have political reasons and goals they cite. Not all of them might be attainable, as real conflicts of interest might not be possible to solve. However, as we have seen from the past, if a conflict cannot be won by force, then in the long term we need to include negotiation to come to a resolution. I'm not suggesting that the current conflict with ISIL can be won by bringing them to the table. As terrorist researchers rightly state, sometimes terrorists want to destroy the table instead of sitting at it. But in the long term, different means need to be taken and different avenues explored at least in addition to the fighting. We have seen that a total elimination of the Islamist threat is not possible. Therefore, the only other option, when the situation has stabilized somewhat, is to engage in dialogue and to see where compromises can be made.

The violence of ISIL probably also stems from certain needs and the striving to fulfill them. If we do, or not, apply the idea of life or death force here (according to Freud) does not matter as much as understanding that there are motivations behind this violence. Failure might lead to fear, which might lead to the willingness to accept compromise. But compromise also means we need to be able to give something in return. I have long argued that the only way out of this form of violence is substantial development in the broader Middle East and Africa. Stability and democracy will only come when these areas are no longer a gap in our globalized, integrated and developing world. [31]

There are several angles of course from which to view terrorisms motivations. I will go through them in the following order: First, I will look at the issue of psychology, which is looking inside the mind of the terrorist. It asks, what mental processes do motivate terrorist and are they psychologically abnormal or show definite characteristics at which we can identify them. Psychologists had a hard time to get terrorists on the couch and analyse them, however, some conclusions can be made.

The first statement to make is that terrorists have been found to be entirely rational and generally speaking normal people [32] . Terrorists are usually not psychotic, and show no specific psychiatric abnormalities. This has been shown repeatedly in studies on the psychology of terrorism. The reason for this has been speculated as that organisations would rather avoid recruiting individuals with a mental illness as they would pose a risk to the security of the group. Terrorism is a highly clandestine endeavour and psychotic individuals would present the risk of compromising this. The only exception seem to be lone wolf terrorists, such as Ted Kaczynski and Anders Behring Breivik (as well as a number of less well known cases), both of whom have been speculated to be mentally ill [33] . In both cases, paranoid schizophrenia was suspected, but then rejected in court. The personalities, abnormal ideas that resemble delusions, and withdrawal from society that is common in lone wolf terrorists makes schizophrenia an obvious candidate diagnosis. But apart from that, usually terrorists are believed to be mentally healthy and rational. Recently, however, this long held belief has been challenged. Some studies and scholars purported the belief that terrorists and radicalised individuals are to be found more in the isolated and depressed parts of society, both in the West as well as in the Middle East [34]

To explain this new finding, we need to engage more with the traditional theories on what makes a terrorist. Some are rather strange, such as the hypothesis that terrorists suffer from inner ear problems or that they are more prone to arousal and aggression generally and become inspired by

simply watching aggressive content on the media. [35] These theories have usually not made it to today. But some are still more prominent. There have been theories going back to Freud where Narcicism has been connected to terrorist violence as well as a negative identity formation. Narcicism is developed when a person is smothered in their childhood and later on fails to adapt their egocentric personality by testing it against reality. The world is increasingly seen as evil and the self inflated as good. This makes the basis for attributing blame to others for perceived injustices. The negative identity hypothesis posits that children perceive their father figure as rejecting. From this onwards, they develop an aversion towards authority, which then is not only directed against their own father, but in the long run also against the state as an authority. They develop an identity, which rejects all authority and come in conflict first with the law and then with the state. In fact, it has been found that sociologically many terrorist have been found to have had family problems, such as divorce or death in the family, and had offended and been in conflict with the law before them becoming terrorists. A troubled youth, though, is not a good predictor for determining who will become a terrorist as many people experience these problems and never consider terrorism [36] .

A more prominent hypothesis is the frustration aggression hypothesis. It was established by psychologists to explain how aggression occurs in people, and the interesting finding in psychology is that much aggression is caused by negative stimuli [37] . For example, in experiments with animals and humans it has been found that stressors such as noise, heat and overcrowding lead to higher levels of aggression. Pain, obviously, is a strong aggressor. With regards to heat it has even been found that under hot conditions, such as in summer time, there are more crimes conducted than when it is cold. These kind of stimuli led some researchers conclude that frustration could cause aggression. [38] Frustration refers to a stress situation in which goals are thwarted. Needs cannot be fulfilled. This again builds on Maslows needs theory [39] in which basic and more higher needs have to be fulfilled as the primary motivating force for humans. If need fulfillment – or goal fulfillment – is thwarted, this leads to frustration, and in many cases this is a precursor for aggression. Initially, the researchers believed that frustration always leads to aggression, but they revised this hypothesis to argue that it is a possible cause. In people who just don't have the opportunities for aggression or who are generally more passive – learned helplessness is a keyword here – aggression does not need to occur from frustration. But the mechanism has been established in the literature and Ted Robert Gurr applied it to explain why men rebel, in a publication with the same title. He referred to frustration being caused by relative deprivation, which refers essentially to relative poverty and lack of economic and political opportunities [40] .

Furthermore, more recently Borum has identified several vulnerabilities, which are responsible for terrorism [41] . There needs to be a need to belong, which is essential in his explanation. A feeling of being disconnected from society and a need to integrate into a group, which provides with meaning and purpose, is essential for humans and if it is not fulfilled can lead to choosing a dissenting path and integration into a clandestine group that fulfills just this need. Also, typically terrorists adopt a certain special mind-set framed as an ideology. These ideologies are usually dichotomous, meaning they provide a mind-set of us versus them. The other is described in a totalitarian manner as evil and as to blame for all the ills the terrorists perceive. The rationale follows the storyline of: It is not right, It is your fault, you are therefore evil.

But what is the political element in people turning towards terrorism? Terrorism is an attempt to solve a conflict. A misguided attempt, to be sure, involving the use of violence, but an attempt nonetheless. It has been stated that terrorism is the ‘weapon of the weak’ [42] . How has this weakness been brought about? At the very beginning of a lengthy process leading to terrorism stands exclusion. Groups are being put in a minority position and marginalised [43] . This loss of status is then accompanied by material and social negative effects, such as exclusion from economic opportunities, geographic seclusion, and such [44] . The status of the excluded minority, when repeatedly reinstated, leads to feelings of shame and frustration, which have long been linked to aggression in the psychological literature. [45] The resulting aggression leads to oppositional behaviour, challenging the authorities responsible for marginalisation, by sometimes even attacking the majority population. This is usually responded to by repression. But it a game of tit for tat, this repression is responded to with further aggression. [46] If force is used to repress the revolting minority, violence might well be the logical response. When we ask terrorists why they commit their crimes, they always answer that they respond to violent oppression with violence. [47] This is just the last stage in a process of escalation where one side pushes the other side outside the fringes of the social reference frame and strips them off their privileges and resources.

The process is similar to that which leads particularly young individuals into criminal activity. Exclusion, marginalisation, oppositional behaviour followed by repression, with an ensuing process of conflict escalation (with the law) are common in youth crime and might even have contributed to phenomena such as lone wolf terrorism, which is at the borderline of crime and politically organised violence.

This process can be observed in many cases of terrorism, from the RAF, to the IRA, to Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. For a prevention of terrorism, therefore, we need to ensure that marginalised groups are being integrated and not pushed further outside their respective societies. In the psychological literature on terrorism, the ‘need to belong’ is stated again and again as a motivating factor for terrorism. In the literature about crime, it is more about ‘status’. Both indicate a lack of – and therefore a need for – successful integration into society. What differs might be the scale of exclusion and marginalisation and the interpretation of this as an insult. [48] Different to mental illness and crime, which in their social and political causes are similar to terrorism, in terrorism it is always collectives that are affected.

The ‘Global War on Terrorism’, since its beginning, has focused more on military and intelligence measures to counter the threat than applying softer means towards this goal. With March 2011, Congress had approved a total of \$1.283 trillion ‘for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).’ [49] Of this, \$1,414.8 billion were assigned to the two military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2007 the spending for the military efforts amounted to \$170.9 billion, in 2008 to \$185.7 billion and in 2009 to \$155.1 billion. Other estimates even figured the costs for the Iraq war alone at above \$3 trillion. [50]

Compared to that, overall the United States in 2007 spent \$18,901 million on foreign aid to developing countries; in 2008 the sum amounted to \$23,860 million. In 2009, the United States spent \$25,174 million on foreign aid. In 2009, the Near East and South Asia together received \$11,778 million in grants and credits; Africa received \$6,022 million. In 2008, the total foreign assistance from the United States towards North Africa and the Middle East amounted to \$13,956 million, of which \$8,382 million comprised military assistance. [51] Therefore, the military aspects have received more attention in the foreign policies generally, and in counterterrorism policy specifically. It has been argued that the military-centred approach against terrorism has had several problematic effects. The most prominent among them obviously is the legitimacy-crisis which the United States created with its highly disputed intervention in Iraq. According to international law – so the widespread concern – being an illegal act of aggression, this intervention has set precedents of unilateral attack which could – and with the case of Russia potentially already has – erode the general will to comply with the international standard of non-aggression lest it be authorized by the United Nations Security Council. The implications of this for future international relations should not be underestimated. If international law is not upheld by the strongest power in the world, who will protect it and comply with it? Secondly, particularly the Iraq intervention has brought the hegemon, the United States, into mis-credit with the international community as well as the peoples of the world. [52] While the approval rates for the US have shot up to previous levels under Obama, foreign policies such as these mentioned could serve to decrease the legitimacy and consensus which the US hegemony is based on. This could affect global stability as well as the international capacity to cooperate and to create trust among nations.

Finally, and maybe most importantly, military strategies to counter terrorism serve short-term goals, but aid little to guarantee long-term success in the struggle against political violence. The argument, that military interventions increase the motivational basis – as a precondition – to engage in terrorism against the perceived occupational power has been theoretically and empirically substantiated [53]. But not only do interventions increase hatred against the West, also – per se – they help little to address other underlying conditions which contribute to the emergence of terrorism.

Issues, such as rampant unemployment, substandard education, poor social services and healthcare, and a general lack of development with at least the chance to future prosperity need to be addressed to tackle what has been described as lying at the root of the problem of political violence. The recent uprisings in the Middle East are just one outcome of a serious development crisis in the region. ISIL and Al Qaeda are capitalizing on the volatile situation in the region. Poverty, inequality, etc., are all regarded as preconditions for terrorism to occur, and while the leading figures of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda might be affluent, the footsoldiers often are from the impoverished, unemployed strata. Young people, particularly male, without reasonable expectations for their lives are more vulnerable to be recruited by terrorist groups.

Political oppression and lack of democracy, freedom and participation are also important aspects contributing to the emergence of terrorism. However, while rhetorically important in the past, the spread of these goods is not necessarily aided by military interventions – at least not on their own. Political change, while desirable, is not necessarily achieved by interventions. Democracy has to be built from below, engaging peoples power. As the recent events in the Middle East

illustrate, peoples are ready for change in many places. Supporting their struggles is a reasonable strategy. Libya hopefully will turn out as a more successful example of democratization, than, for example, Afghanistan. However, supporting these developments with military power alone will not be enough to secure stabilization and democracy in the long- term in these cases. Additional supporting policies are necessary to engage these new democracies and aid them on their way to stabilization. Otherwise, the short-term euphoria of victory and change will be overshadowed by years with increased occurrence of violence, as we already observe in Syria, for example. For stabilization, though, integration of these states, and for enabling widespread support, we need the mechanisms of ‘good global governance’.

For making the argument that a revised counterterrorism policy is needed, we need to investigate the motivations for terrorism again. An effective counterterrorism policy should, arguably, address these motivations, or ‘root causes’ of terrorism and thereby reduce its renewed occurrence.

The case of ISIL is motivated by a traditional struggle for power, and is underpinned by a clash between Sunni and Shia and a restructured political power game in Iraq specifically. Like other terrorisms, it is fueled by foreign military intervention and occupation. [54] Loss of power can arguably be redressed by a broad development strategy. Related to that and supporting this argument, poverty and inequality contribute to terrorism in many cases. While the connection between underdevelopment and civil war is clearly established, a similar connection between terrorism and underdevelopment is harder to make. Part of the problem results from the mere structure of particularly transnational terrorist groups, who, by their very nature are spanning potentially the whole globe and acting across borders. On the other hand, some successful attempts at showing a positive relation between poverty in countries of origin and the emergence of terrorism from these countries have been made. Mesquita [55] has presented the recent findings with regards to poverty or underdevelopment. As Mesquita finds, the results with regard to the relation between poverty and terrorism are mixed, but indicative. On the one hand, Krueger and Laitin found that ‘wealthy countries are more likely to suffer terrorist attacks and that economic performance is not a statistically significant predictor of which countries terrorists emerge from’. [56] Abadie [57] finds no statistically significant relationship between per capita GDP and terrorism risk. On the other hand, several authors have found a ‘statistically significant negative correlation between measures of economic performance and the level of terrorist violence’ [58]. Also, Li and Schaub [59] found that economic development in a country reduces terrorism in that country. Another approach focuses on the economic situation of terrorists themselves. Krueger and Maleckova [60] and Berrebi [61] find that terrorist operatives from Hezbollah and Hamas are ‘neither poor nor poorly educated’ [62]. Usually, they are well educated and come from relatively well-off backgrounds. Therefore, so the argument, improving the economic conditions in a country would not have any impact on reducing the emergence of terrorism. This argument has been refuted. For one, terrorist groups are complex entities, with their own internal hierarchies and structures. And it has been established that the lower ranks among these groups, such as the suicide bombers themselves, are rather found to be coming from the unemployed poor than the middle ranks of researchers and technicians, or the upper echelons of leadership figures. Also, it has been argued that terrorist groups apply strategies of recruitment similar to any business organisation: they try to primarily select those individuals from the pool of interessees which are best qualified, best educated. And these are of course not to be found

among the poorest. Finally, terrorist groups need not be comprised of the poorest people themselves in order to make a connection between underdevelopment and this form of violence. It would suffice if these groups adopt the plight of their fellow countrymen, for example, as a motivation to engage in political struggle. [63] It has been stated that the Middle East presents a 'gap' in global development, together with Africa, [64] and this is the region where most terrorism is stemming from. Surely, there is a connection. Military interventions and occupation in addition add to the 'insults' that fuel political violence.

What can be done? Foreign aid is one, but can only be an initial step, in countering the threat. While early on the main focus in the Global War on Terrorism was on the military and intelligence, foreign aid as a tool has also been used to counter terrorism. Even under Bush, in fact, foreign aid to developing countries increased. Recipients have been particularly Afghanistan and Iraq, where schools and hospitals have been built, infrastructure established, and so forth. Foreign aid as a tool to counter terrorism is, however, contended. The main argument utilized against the use of foreign aid for this purpose is the claim that most members of terrorist organisations, such as Al Qaeda, do not belong to the poorer strata of their respective societies. As there is indication, however, that poverty does contribute to the emergence of terrorism, even if probably not alone, foreign aid as a tool to counter this threat should be taken more seriously.

Several studies have researched the potential contribution of foreign aid for the reduction of terrorism. Interestingly, two studies confirm strongly the positive important role of foreign aid for the reduction of terrorism. However, they also caution: Foreign aid, if it is used by illiberal regimes in order to suppress political violence by restricting political freedoms and by generally repressing the population does in fact not help to decrease the emergence of terrorism. Foreign aid is thought to have the most positive effect against terrorism in the country of origin. The following conclusion is worth full mentioning:

The results confirm the effectiveness of foreign aid to reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating from the recipient country. In the host country, the impact of foreign aid may be different as counter- terrorism measures also influence the number of imported attacks. This finding suggests that there are incentive problems regarding the role of foreign aid, which must be not too intrusive in the policy of the recipient government. Foreign military interventions are also counter-productive and they seem to be a strong attraction factor for terrorists. A strong presence of foreign actors in the recipient country or foreign influence might in fact be counter-productive. [65]

This not only confirms the positive impact of foreign aid on terrorism, but also provides evidence against the utility of military means in the struggle against sub-state violence. Particularly the rejection of military means as an effective counterterrorism tools has been well established. [66] Military interventions are thought to rather inspire more hatred against the West; they provide more grounds and motivation to join in the struggle against the perceived 'imperialist' or occupation power. Furthermore, oppressive approaches in the pursuit of counterterrorism have been found to be counterproductive:

The evidence suggests that repressive counterterrorism measures may not be the optimal way to fight terrorism. Government crackdowns and harsh repressive measures funded by foreign aid can create a societal backlash and lead to more support for terrorist groups and thereby increase the supply of terrorist attacks. [67]

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