# Some Skepticism About World Government-Skepticism

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I do not know, of course, whether future generations will manage to create something like a world "government" or enhanced global stateness --a conceptual term, by the way, I consider more useful (for reasons I will presently outline) than those we standardly employ. Nor do I know how anyone could possibly make confident predictions about such matters.[1] At the present, there certainly seem to be sound reasons for viewing world "government" as politically unrealistic, in the sense that it remains exceedingly difficult to imagine how, given existing political and social conditions, it might ever be constructed. Moreover, there are probably not just pragmatic, but solid normative, reasons why we might worry about world "government" and the potential threats posed by it to freedom and equality. Since Kant's famous salvo against the world state, those reasons have been widely discussed.

Yet, having now spent some time examining the scholarly and broader political debate about world government, I am unpersuaded that its critics have presented an airtight case. Yes, there is more than enough room for understandable skepticism about world government and its future prospects, as there are about the practicality of other political and social "ideals" presently distant from present-day realities, e.g., humanitarian democratic socialism, or a robust version of deliberative democracy. In striking contrast to the generally serious and systematic fashion in which scholars debate such normative aspirations, however, the tendency in the literature on world government is to dismiss it out of hand, as though only the politically naïve and/or normatively confused could ever stoop to debate its prospective merits and real-life prospects.[2] Libraries are filled with thick tomes about "ideals" that transcend existing "realities." When one peruses the debate about world government, in contrast, one encounters dismissive, throwaway remarks, crude caricatures, and/or heated polemics.

Against this general trend, let me suggest that what I characterize as global stateness deserves, at the very least, a hearing. As outlined in a classic essay by J.P. Nettl, stateness offers some potential analytic advantages vis-à-vis our usual conceptual language. Most importantly, it underscores the need to disaggregate the modern state's familiar elements --e.g., control over

coercion and other power resources, the capacity to extract taxation, bureaucratization-- so that we can fruitfully consider to what degree which elements are in fact indispensable if "states" are to guarantee security and uphold legality.[3] On Nettl's view, we would do well to transcend common, but overly static and reified, conceptions of the state, in favor of a view of "stateness" as a complex amalgam of features, each of which can probably be realized to lesser or greater degrees. How many different features of stateness may in fact be necessary, and in what ways they might be combined, will vary for complicated and contingent political and socio-cultural reasons. As Nettl observed, stateness entails the performance --more or less capably-- of some basic political and social functions (e.g., legal enforcement, "social goal-attainment" and representation).[4] As his perspective usefully suggests, political theory will need to move beyond potentially misleading conceptual abstractions (e.g., "monopoly on legitimate violence") that haunt our political thinking. Instead, we need to pay more attention to the many ways in which viable states rely on a variety of institutional (and also: cultural) attributes when performing some basic functions.

To the extent that skepticism about world government tends to veil hostility to global stateness, critics need to tread more carefully if they are not to dump the proverbial baby along with the bathwater. Even if we endorse some criticisms of world "government," in short, we may still want to consider enhancing postnational or global stateness. Let me concede that I simply bracket the most systematic, and sometimes illuminating, criticisms of modern "government" or "the state," e.g., those formulated by political and, more recently, philosophical anarchists. I do so for two interrelated reasons. First, those I criticize below usually reject anarchism and, like the author of this paper, think that we should attribute some minimal positive functions to the state, though they have a hard time seeing how such functions could operate "beyond the nation state." Second, I follow the legal theorist Frederick Schauer in presupposing that a normatively desirable and efficacious legal order requires, even when it takes complicated and indirect forms, recourse to sanctions that ultimately depend on the prospect of compulsion or coercion.[5] To the extent that the state (or, in my terms, stateness) remains essential to such functions, those seeking some sort of authentically cosmopolitan legal order will ultimately need to explain how it might better undergird such sanctions than the existing international system seems capable. In short: they need to consider the possible merits of novel forms of stateness "beyond the nation state."

But I have gotten ahead of myself. Let me take a step back and try to justify my skepticism about world government-skepticism.

*World Government as Utopia*

The literature on world government is filled with critical remarks about its allegedly "utopian" character.[6] But the term "utopian" tends to get used, confusedly, in two distinct ways. First, it captures the (probably sensible) intuition that given existing political and social conditions, it seems difficult to imagine anything like a "world government" emerging in the foreseeable future. World government's utopianism, in other words, derives from its disconnect from existing political and social "realities," e.g., the modern nation state system, and the incentive structures it creates for national leaders. Yet, revealingly, that employment of the term still

leaves open the possibility that something like world government might represent a desirable eventual institutional goal, that its infeasible and "utopian" contours rest chiefly on the observation that if, in fact, it is normatively and politically desirable, it only makes sense to view it as such for the distant future. Second, the "utopian" invective captures the idea that world government is not only removed from existing realities, but also that it would necessarily constitute a fundamentally unattractive or "bad" utopia. In this second sense, it would irrepressibly violate valuable normative and political commitments. Accordingly, world government is dystopian along the lines of Friedrich Hayek's influential attack on mid-twentieth century proposals for a centrally planned, state economy: its main flaw was not that it seemed temporally rather far-off (Hayek, in fact, saw it already at work in both Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany), but instead that it egregiously undermined valuable classical liberal ideas of liberty and equality.

For now, let me simply observe that critics tend use these two senses of the term "utopian" interchangeably. And they move rapidly from the first to the second, without always having done the requisite theoretical homework.

This slippage is probably found, for example, in John Rawls' landmark *Law of Peoples*. As is well known, Rawls began his discussion by describing his own proposals for a reformed international order as a "realistic utopia," which he defined as extending

"what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility and, in so      doing, reconcil[ing] us to our political and social condition…What would a reasonably just constitutional democracy be like under reasonably favorable historical conditions that are possible given the laws and tendencies of society? And how do these conditions relate to laws and tendencies bearing on the relations between peoples?"[7]

For our purposes here, the keystone of Rawls' claim was that his idea of a "realistic utopia," though potentially congruent with some proposals for global reform, a priori excluded others. Consequently, he announced he was simply following

"Kant's lead in *Perpetual Peace* (1795) in thinking that a world government –by which I mean a unified political regime with the legal powers normally exercised by central governments— would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom and autonomy."[8]

In effect, Rawls moved abruptly from asserting that sensible, "realistic" reform proposals should always be based on the "laws and tendencies of [existing] society" to a principled critique of world government as a "bad" or "negative" utopia. Why? Beyond his rapid-fire endorsement of Kant, Rawls never sufficiently defended this claim: Kant's views about the inherently "despotic" character of world government, it seems, sufficed. As Kant also apparently should have taught us, "some kind of loose or confederative" political structure was the best way to buttress the "Law of Peoples."[9]

Now anyone can easily fathom why hyper-centralized, top-down world government might threaten pluralism as well as "political freedom and autonomy." Still, it hardly seems self-

evident that when conceived as relatively decentralized postnational stateness, with extensive lawmaking power left in the hands of local and regional units, it would necessarily have to do so. I make this point for a simple reason: on my reading of the vast literature,[10] sensible advocates of world "government" have not in fact sought a perfectly "unified" regime ruling heavy-handedly over diverse and disparate populations: their real-life inspiration has commonly been Switzerland, not homogeneous, institutionally "unified" nation-states. Nor is it obvious that all of the original grounds for Kant's animosity to world government (about which, by the way, he had decidedly more complex views than Rawls ever let on), deserve our unquestioning fidelity.[11]

More to the point, Rawls' reference to Kant conveniently allowed him to circumvent some messy institutional questions. If in fact the organizations making up his desired "loose" confederation had

"the authority to express for the society of well-ordered peoples their condemnation of unjust domestic institutions in other countries and…[in]n grave cases…may try to correct them by economic sanctions, or even by military intervention"[12]

one might, of course, begin to ask how "loose" his confederation really could be. The thesis that the "Law of Peoples" could dispense with attributes of (postnational) stateness relied substantially on Rawls' embrace of the "democratic peace" hypothesis, a hypothesis that is both more controversial and historically contingent than he seems to have recognized.[13] Despite the usual hostility to the bogeyman of world government, Rawls himself spoke of the virtues of "fruitful cooperative efforts and common experiences over a considerable period of time" between and among separate peoples, joint efforts conventionally depending, he openly acknowledged, on shared social and political institutions.[14] In its legal and political-institutional implications, even Rawls' "diversity among reasonable peoples" in a "society of peoples'" seems institutionally more open-ended than he probably wanted to concede.

More to the point, neither states nor politically-constituted "peoples" are the homogeneous units many once wanted them to be. What Alessandro Ferrara dubs "hyperpluralism" already poses tough questions for many existing political communities.[15] The conventional view of a "sharp distinction…between the kind of pluralism found within states and within the international legal arena," in other words, seems much less clear than was once the case.[16] Consequently, it remains somewhat unclear why global stateness necessarily poses qualitatively different challenges than those we face more and more within populous, pluralistic polities.

How best to make sense of the nexus between global pluralism and political institutions, obviously, remains complicated. My point for now is modest: skepticism about world government's present or near-future feasibility should not open the door automatically to categorically hostile normative assessments of global stateness. Though I cannot sufficiently document this claim here, much of the literature oscillates between two versions of the "utopianism" accusation I described above, with skepticism about world government's present prospects leading writers to reproduce a series of stock arguments against world government, e.g., the Kantian view that it would necessarily generate "despotism." As with Rawls, writers too often simply repeat the usual reservations about world government without pausing to investigate

them. At closer look, however, many of them may be less persuasive than initially appears to be evident.[17]

*Cosmopolitanism's Missing State Theory*

Perhaps the most surprising attribute of contemporary political cosmopolitanism is its principled enmity to the once commonplace thesis among its historical precursors (e.g., Bertrand Russell's nuclear "one-worldism") that world government represents the best way to undergird global lawmaking. Contemporary cosmopolitans aggressively reject such "statist" views in favor of what they prefer to call global governance, typically characterized as a multilayered system of decision making allegedly missing core features of modern statehood. Given the commonplace association of world government with tyranny and despotism, this move, of course, seems convenient: it allows cosmopolitans to circumvent stock criticisms of world government.

At closer examination, however, cosmopolitans make things too easy for themselves. They gain rhetorical mileage against institutionally cautious defenders of the international status quo, but only at the cost of obscuring some salient conceptual and theoretical issues.

The main problem is present-day cosmopolitanism's underdeveloped --and sometimes crude-- definition of the state. Cosmopolitans rarely devote their otherwise impressive intellectual energies to examining any of the tough conceptual and empirical questions concerning the modern state, questions that have preoccupied generations of political scientists and sociologists. Instead, they typically start with quick definitions of the state as possessing supreme, final, absolute, and potentially unconstrained authority, and consisting of a more-or-less perfectly hierarchical, centralized apparatus whose potentially unaccountable and lawless contours, Daniele Archibugi revealingly asserts, are decisive.[18] Because the modern state is linked to what Andrew Kuper describes as a retrograde "neo-Hobbesian paradigm," we need to transcend it in order to develop a more satisfactory global post-statist system type of political authority.[19] Other cosmopolitans simply rely on the standard textbook version of Weber's famous definition of the modern state as resting on a monopoly over legitimate coercion.

Cosmopolitans often proceed to highlight the alleged virtues of a novel (allegedly) non-statist mode of global "governance," in which political authority would be widely dispersed, accountable and strictly subject to law, and where we no longer could identify a single institutional site with a monopoly on coercive power. In his hugely influential version of the argument, Thomas Pogge describes his preferred model as a "loose federal [global] system in which the political authority currently exercised by national governments is both constrained and dispersed over several layers."[20] Pace standard dogmas about state sovereignty, and in opposition to the idea of a world "state," "[l]aw-governed coexistence is possible without a supreme and unconstrained agency," as supposedly demonstrated by the "historical facts of the last 200 years or so," when relatively decentralized federal systems (e.g., Switzerland) have in fact thrived.[21] For Pogge, as for many others, global "governance" prospectively circumvents the presumed perils of global "government" by building on existing federal models that lack core attributes of modern sovereignty or statehood.

In fact, it is now a familiar cosmopolitan commonplace to envision a loose multilayered federal order, or --in some alternative formulations, a novel order located "between" standard confederal and federal models[22] --as exemplary nonstatist global governance. This trend, however, builds on a conflation of the conceptual tools of modern political and social theory with the actual empirical realities of modern states, as though one could simply consult Hobbes and/or Weber to understand the messy working exigencies of real-life modern "states." Why assume that Hobbes and/or Weber deserve the final say on the modern state? Why employ them, explicitly or otherwise, as a conceptual yardstick? More fundamentally: even if it does not make much sense to conceive of prospective world "government" along Hobbesian or Weberian lines, might not political cosmopolitanism still benefit from a good dose of global stateness?

 Significantly, the French political sociologists Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum have highlighted the modern state's astonishingly "plural and multiform" features, with many historically viable "states" meshing poorly with our standard definitions.[23] Though normative-minded cosmopolitans seem uninterested in the relevant controversies, a key implication is that their uninterrogated conceptual framework distorts the messy realities of modern stateness. Their reliance on textbook definitions provides at best a troublesome starting point not only for making sense of non-western states,[24] but even federal systems like the Switzerland or the US. Lurking in the background is a simplified rendition of Weber's famous definition. That rendition simply forgets that it was intended as an ideal type whose key attributes were unlikely to be completely realized anywhere.[25] For that matter, a voluminous critical literature highlights serious limitations with Weber's political sociology.[26] Even those inspired by Weber sometimes concede that the idea of a monopoly on legitimate coercion represents an inappropriate conceptual yardstick, best jettisoned for a more nuanced view of the state as having "authoritative binding rule making backed up by some organizational force."[27] The trend in the literature, at any rate, has been to offer substantially more flexible definitions of the modern state.[28]

Having obscured the modern state's complex conceptual and empirical contours, and then proffered institutional models decidedly less removed from them than cosmopolitans acknowledge, they tend "to bring the state back in," that is, outfit (allegedly) nonstatist global "governance" with familiar element of modern stateness. Pogge wants a centralization of weapons of mass destruction into global hands,[29] while others demand a permanent "seconding" of national military units into new international authorities,[30] or a global "ready-reserve force."[31] Such proposals would, in effect, equip prospective global institutions with substantial coercive power and thus one of modern stateness' standard traits. Only because their initial definition of the modern state (and state sovereignty) function as conceptual straw-men can cosmopolitans claim not in fact to be seeking significant elements of global stateness.

 The other side of political cosmopolitanism's underdeveloped theory of the state is its embrace, as I have already intimated, of global governance. Unfortunately, that idea's massive popularity partly derives from its frustratingly open-ended character, with Claus Offe accurately noting that it refers to "diverse and contradictory semantic contents and associations," opening the door to a multiplicity of  shotgun marriages with no less diverse political and scholarly partners.[32] Any examination of the many attempts to define "global governance" suggests a striking lacuna: it gets associated with a mindboggling variety of political and social agents, institutions, and

practices. Nation-states as well as global and regional institutions like the UN and EU, powerful economic organizations such as the WTO and IMF, are grouped alongside civil society, NGOs, private forms of self-regulation (e.g., the *Lex Mercatoria),* so-called global "networks" and public-private partnerships, and sometimes even global capitalism.[33]

James Rosenau's influential early definition of global governance as including "systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to the international organization—in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions" already anticipated the term's subsequent ambiguities.[34] "Systems of rule" revealingly included not only "command and control" devices directly related to government, but also non-formal "control mechanisms" based on "a modicum of regularity, a form of recurrent behavior."[35] Conventional attempts to differentiate distinct forms of political and social action --recall, for example, Weber's famous typological distinctions between and among convention, custom, and law[36] --get pushed aside, at the price of occluding potentially significant distinctions. Since intensified globalization processes also mean that every (loosely defined) "system of rule" potentially has "transnational repercussions," global governance could easily refer to any and every conceivable form of social activity, and thus perhaps to none in particular. As Rosenau elsewhere conceded,

"[g]lobal governance knows no boundaries, geographic, social, cultural, economic, or political. If…new trading partners are established, if labor and environmental groups in different countries form cross-border coalitions, if cities begin to conduct their own foreign commercial policies…then the consequences of such developments will ripple across and fan out at provincial, regional, national, and international levels as well as across and within local communities."[37]

As Offe has accurately observed, global governance consequently becomes an "irredeemably overstretched concept" that tends to get in the way of making empirically and normatively vital distinctions.[38]

Though global governance is often described as including both government-centered and non-governmental institutions and practices, those who embrace the concept tend to operate with a simple binary divide: "government" is defined as consisting of formal authority, hierarchy, command-based and centralized decision making, top-down steering, and "external" (i.e., force-based or coercive) imposition and enforcement. As government's conceptual "other," "governance" is depicted as consisting of informal forms of compromise, mutual adjustment, or negotiations; horizontal (or "heterarchical"[39]) rather than hierarchical authority resting on "bottom-up" mechanisms; multiplicity in decision making sites rather than their centralization; the internalization of informal norms instead of their external (coercive) enforcement. [40] Governance depends on "interactive" and decentered networks,[41] social partnerships, and, in some accounts, markets, rather than centralized police powers or the state's monopoly on legitimate violence.[42] Even before any real evidence has been amassed to support the implicit and arguably controversial claims at hand, global governance has already been congenitally linked to "non-corrupt, transparent, informal, citizen-friendly, legitimate, efficient, responsible, collective goods producing effective, common good-oriented, horizontal, problem adequate and

participatory" forms of rule.[43] In contrast, "government" is associated with hierarchy, compulsion or violence, and "top-down" rule.

Is it any wonder that political cosmopolitans have eagerly embraced the idea of global governance? That analytic choice, alongside what sometimes can only be described as a built-in antistatist bias,[44] has been predetermined by the term's implicit conceptual (and probably ideological) framing. Unfortunately, cosmopolitanism's ideational romance with global governance compounds the failures of its (absent) theory of the state.

*Back to Realism?*

Ian Shapiro's recent broadside against world government cannot be chalked up to latent Hobbesian or Weberian notions of the state, or a characteristically cosmopolitan soft spot for "global governance." He takes his bearings from political realism and, especially, George Kennan's conservative version of "IR realism." Along the way, Shapiro dismisses suggestions (including some from this writer) that even some "hard-headed" mid-century IR Realists can be productively read as proponents of global stateness. Shapiro will have none of it: not only world government, but also cosmopolitanism and even "global constitutionalism," smack of political and intellectual naivete.

Shapiro does not deny that injustice --or what he dubs "domination"--operates across existing national boundaries. How then best to combat it? Not by wooly-headed globalism, but by pursuing "other forms of accountability across borders. These include pushing for greater civil and criminal culpability to redress harms and deter future perpetrators and building coalitions to advance proximate goals that have some prospect of reducing the worst firm of domination."[45] Multinationals culpable for economic injustice "can be sued, sometimes in their country of origin, for torts committed abroad when they put local populations at risk." [46] Rather than waiting for the Godot of world government, activists should use existing legal and juridical devices to challenge multinational corporations, or build political coalitions to push for more ambitious goals, e.g., a global minimum wage he views as having a realistic chance of becoming "established and relatively institutionalized."[47]

Much can be said in favor of such "realistic" political and legal strategies. Indeed, we should reject any model of world government as a strictly Weberian (and sometimes Hobbesian) enterprise: a hyper-centralized world state would face serious "enforcement difficulties and collective action obstacles" and perhaps prove ineffective at reducing global injustices.[48] To his credit, Shapiro tentatively points towards a more subtle (and realistic) theory of the state than we find among cosmopolitans: "often the state's coercive capacities are incomplete and its legitimacy questioned by significant sectors of the population…."[49]

Unfortunately, that potentially fruitful analytic move is short-circuited by Shapiro's (realist) sympathies for existing nation-states and a global order where they remain fundamentally sovereign. Though his own analysis (occasionally) prepares the ground for an appreciation of what I have been calling "stateness," he fails to tackle (or even recognize) the resulting

questions. Even if a Weberian world state constitutes a "bad" utopia, for example, what about other possibilities for expanding and/or enhancing stateness "beyond the nation state"? After we have knocked down the straw man of hyper-centralized, top-heavy Weberian and/or Hobbesian world government, might we still have grounds for defending the expansion of some supranational state-like functions? If existing "states" do not match Weberian or Hobbesian ideational stereotypes, it becomes difficult to see why we should limit the discussion of global political authority, as Shapiro does, to a critique of Hobbesian and Weberian renditions of it.

Shapiro's more ambitious proposals for global change –e.g., a global minimum wage that has been "relatively institutionalized" --suggest the need for a more nuanced analysis. Enforcement of a global minimum wage, to be sure, would probably not require placing overwhelming military force in the hands of a centralized world government. However, it still might entail significantly improved postnational enforcement mechanisms --and, yes, backing up legal sanctions with correspondingly complex coercive devices-- than our existing international order permits. In other words: we still might need a substantial dose of postnational stateness if a global minimum wage were to prove "relatively institutionalized."

Unfortunately, Shapiro never really takes such concerns seriously. After rushing to discard "idealistic" and "utopian" globalist ideas, he rapidly reverts to the realism of George Kennan (and, surprisingly, the "creative effort and leadership" of George H. Bush).[50] While recalling Kant's critique of world government, he succumbs to a mistake Kant never made: he fails to acknowledge that our emerging postnational constellation demands new and ambitious institutional forms "beyond the nation state."

[1] See, however, Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9 (2003): 491-542.

[2] For the latest example, Ian Shapiro, *Politics Against Domination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 103-30.

[3]  J.P. Nettl, "The State as Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (1968), 559-92.

[4]  Nettl, "The State as Conceptual Variable," 586. I say more about Nettl's notion of stateness in "From Global Governance to Global Stateness," in Robert Schuett and Peter M.R. Stirk (ed.), *The Concept of the State in International Relations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), pp. 187-220.

[5] Frederick Schauer, *The Force of Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

[6] For the documentation, see my *The Realist Case for Global Reform* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), pp. 149-68.

[7] John Rawls, *Law of Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 11.

[8] Rawls, *Law of Peoples*, p. 36. Rawls' deployment of Kant, illuminatingly, directly mirrors that of arch-international realists such as Kenneth Waltz.

[9] Rawls, *Law of Peoples,* p. 61.

[10] For a helpful overview, see Catherine Lu, "World Government," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*; available at *plato.stanford.edu/entries/world-government/*.

[11] William E. Scheuerman, "Cosmopolitanism and the World State," *Review of International Studies* 40(2014), 421-25.

[12] Rawls, *Law of Peoples*, p. 36.

[13] "Among reasonably just and decent peoples," Rawls declared, "the control of such [nuclear] weapons would be relatively easy, since they could be effectively banned" (*Law of Peoples,* p. 9) Many "nuclear one-worldists" have refused to endorse this view (Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest, *Nuclear Realism: Global Political Thought During the Thermonuclear Revolution* [New York: Routledge, 2016).

[14] Rawls, *Law of Peoples*, p. 113.

[15] Alessandro Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[16] Tamir, "Who's Afraid of a Global State?" p. 256.

[17] Scheuerman, *Realist Case for Global Reform*, pp. 149-68.

[18]  See, for example, Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 149-52; Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 31-47; Michael Goodhart, *Democracy as Human Rights: freedom and Equality in the Age of Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 73-91; Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," in *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002), pp. 177-81. Daniele Archibugi, *Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[19]  Andrew Kuper, *Democracy Beyond Borders: From Demos to Demoi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 132.

[20] Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," p. 191.

[21] Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," p. 179.

[22] Archibugi, *Global Commonwealth of Citizens*, pp. 109-110; Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 230.

[23] Badie and Birnbaum, "Sociology of the State Revisited," *International Social Science Journal* 46: 2 (1994), 165.

[24] Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[25] Andreas Anter, *Max Webers Theorie des modernen Staates. Herkunft, Struktur und Bedeutung* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1995).

[26] On Hannah Arendt's challenges to Weber, for example, see Christian Volk, *Arendtian Constitutionalism: Law, Politics and the Order of Freedom* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015).

[27] Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 55.

[28] "Although coercion is the ultimate sanction available to states, they have other methods of enforcement to secure compliance" (Jessop, *State Power* [Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008]), p. 10).

[29]  Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," pp. 181-82.

[30]  Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 230, 270-71.

[31] Goodhart, *Democracy as Human Rights*, pp. 189-90.

[32]  Offe, "Governance: An 'Empty Signifier,'" *Constellations* 16:4 (2009), 551.

[33] See, for example, the survey in Mark Bevir and Ian Hall, "'Global Governance', in Bevir (ed.), *Sage Handbook of Governance* (London: Sage, 2011), pp. 352-65.

[34] Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," *Global* Governance 1: 1 (1995), 13.

[35]  Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," 14-15. More recently, Thomas Weiss has characterized global governance as referring to "the sum of the informal and formal values, norms, procedures, and institutions that help all actors –states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), civil society, transnational corporations (TNCs), and individuals –to identify, understand, and address trans-boundary problems" (Weiss, *Global Governance: Why? What? Whither?* [Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013], p. 2*).* Even here, the definition remains remarkably broad and diffuse: it includes "informal, formal, values, norms, procedures and institutions" aiding potentially any and every "actor."

[36] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), pp. 120-32.

[37]  Rosenau, "Governance and Democracy in a Globalizing World," in D. Archibugi, D. Held, and M.Köhler (ed.), *Reimagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 31.

[38]  Offe, "Governance: An 'Empty Signifier,'" p. 552.

[39]  Bob Jessop, "The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of Economic Development," *International Social Science Journal* 155 (1998), 29-45.

[40] The binary contrast described here is commonplace and is found even in relatively sophisticated attempts at conceptual clarification. See, for example, Bevir and Hall, "Global Governance;" Julia Blumenthal, "Governance –Eine Kritische Zwischenbilanz," in *Zeitschrift fuer Politikwissenschaft* 15:4 (2005), 1149-1180 (which provides an excellent survey); Thomas Risse, "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood," in Risse (ed.), *Governance without a State: Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).  Rosenau, "Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics," in Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), *Governance without Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) pp. 1-29; Gerry Stoker, "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions," in *International Social Science Journal*, 155 (1998), 17-28; Michael Zuern, "Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt –eine Zwischenbilanz," in G. Schuppert and M. Zuern (ed.), *Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt* (Wiesbaden: Verlag fuer Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), pp. 553-80.

[41] On networks and global governance, see Ann-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[42] Bevir and Hall, "Global Governance."

[43] Offe, "Governance: An 'Empty Signifier,'" 557.

[44]  Blumenthal, "Governance –Eine Kritische Zwischenbilanz," 1170-1176.

[45] Shapiro, *Politics Against Domination,* pp. 104-5

[46] Shapiro, *Politics Against Domination,* p. 116.

[47] Shapiro, *Politics Against Domination,* p. 127.

[48] Shapiro, *Politics Against Domination,* p. 117.

[49] Shapiro, *Politics Against Domination,* p. 107.

[50] Shapiro, *Politics Against Domination,* p. 180.